Symposium Abstracts

Mr Todd Korb
Northrop Grumman Defence Systems
Mr Greg Mathams
Northrop Grumman Australia

Abstract

Northrop Grumman (NG) has extensive history in the design and manufacture of warheads and propulsion systems, including Solid Rocket Motors (SRMs), that are effectively employed across numerous missile systems. On this journey NG has become a world leader in GWEO Industrialisation and the design/uplift of production facilities. NG are working hard to bring this knowledge, know-how and know-why to Australia's Sovereign GWEO ecosystem. This paper will describe our journey, framing the current outlook and challenges, the evolution of SRM and warhead production within NG and how we solved the challenges, presenting a compelling strategy for Australia's GWEO uplift.

Firstly, we will set the outlook and challenges for SRM and warheads: massive increases in
demand, challenges in capital expenditure budgets, the need for flexibility and agility, and being
at the forefront of technology to safely, cheaply and quickly deliver SRM and warhead products
to the customer.

Secondly, we will describe the evolution of NG GWEO manufacturing, focusing on Allegany
Ballistics Laboratory (ABL) in West Virginia United States, and how this site has evolved to be a
living and successful example of how SRM and warhead design and production challenges are
tackled and solved.

Thirdly, we will explain strategies implemented and lessons learnt as we developed and
evolved. We reflect on how we effectively invested in infrastructure and massively expanded
capacity/footprint amongst all this future uncertainty and constraints. We assess how we
balanced various products/programs, safely and effectively, through our detailed capacity
planning and analysis methodology, processes and tools.

Finally, we will draw together observations of Australia's GWEO manufacturing challenges, and
summarise how NG's pedigree, lived experience and contemporary program planning and execution methodology provides a compelling path forward for sovereign SRM and warhead manufacture.

Download Presentation

Mr Thinus Neethling
K39 Consulting

Abstract

The Safety and Suitability for Service (S3) of complex and non-complex Explosive Ordnance (EO) present the ADF with increasingly complex and challenging problems, especially with the dawn of the Guided Weapons and EO (GWEO) Enterprise that was announced by the Australian Federal Government on the 31st of March 2021.
Where electrically initiated EO are concerned, the problems are exacerbated given their inevitable exposure to dynamic, ever-changing Electromagnetic Environments (EMEs) and the mobility of military personnel and platforms with installed RF emitters, which also transport EO, or have installed or loaded EO. The exponential increase in the number of different types and configurations of RF emitters, coupled with increases in transmitter power and/or antenna gain, co-location of RF emitters and the prevalence of (some very sensitive) Electro-explosive Devices (EEDs), further contribute to the problem.

Electrically initiated EO have one or more EEDs installed inside them, to fulfil a range of different potential functions. By design, an EED will function when exposed to an electrical firing stimulus with a suitable amplitude and duration. Unfortunately, EEDs may also be inadvertently initiated when exposed to any Electro-explosive Hazard (EEH) such as RF radiation, Electrostatic Discharge (ESD), or lightning, to mention but a few. The consequences of inadvertent initiation of an EED, and the parent EO item, may be catastrophic, as it may result in the loss of life, destruction of weapon systems or military platforms, or a temporary or enduring loss of capability.
The risks associated with EEH can therefore be potentially detrimental to the ADF's interoperability objective.
This paper highlights a number of unsettling recent developments concerning Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance (HERO) and considers the strategies to ensure the ongoing safety and suitability of electrically initiated EO.

Download Presentation

Dr Kevin Jaansalu
Munitions Safety Information Analysis Center (MSIAC)

Abstract

AOP-15 describes the NATO process for assessment of the Safety and Suitability for Service (S3) of non-nuclear munitions. This standard was last updated over 15 years ago. Since 2018, NATO committee AC/326 SG/B has been working on an updated version which is now nearing completion.

This presentation describes the updated NATO S3 assessment process that will be published in AOP-15 Edition D in 2025. Consideration is given to changes compared to the previous edition and the likely impact on existing national S3 processes.
A brief introduction is also provided for the MSIAC S3 Seminar, a two day in-person training course available for delivery to defence organisations of MSIAC member nations.

Finally, an update is provided on the new MSIAC Safety Assessment Software (SASo) tool, which allows users to generate a Manufacture to Target or Disposal Sequence (MTDS) and a list of relevant munition safety requirements through a bespoke graphical user interface.

Download Presentation

Mr Lyndon Tilbrook
QinetiQ Australia

Abstract

Australian interest in and the development of guided weapons in the period immediately after World War Two was world leading. The design and fielding of the Malkara anti-tank missile system by Australia was one of (if not) the first successful land service guided weapon systems. But what spurred this significant activity? How did Australian scientists and engineers gain the required knowledge of the nascent guided weapons technological developments?

This paper will look at how German missiles and the technological know-how were obtained from records and personnel by Australian Defence staff during and immediately after WW2, and how this knowledge was exploited in Australia for the development of unique Australian designed and manufactured guided weapon systems, most notably the Malkara anti-tank system. The paper will also consider the long history of the sharing of technological knowledge amongst allied nations and the parallels that can be drawn to the GWEO Enterprise currently underway in Australia.

Download Presentation

Mr Mark Dundas
Thales

Abstract

Thales has manufactured Trinitrotoluene (TNT) at the Mulwala Explosives Factory for approximately 30 years. Thales has recently undertaken a collaboration with US Government representatives to ensure Thales manufactured TNT meets the requirements and is qualified to the US MIL specification for use in melt pour and pressed charge applications.
The production of TNT in Australia which meets US MIL spec standards is of great strategic importance in the current geopolitical environment to enable the use of Thales manufactured TNT in munitions that may be used via various defence forces around the world interchangeably. This ability to interchangeably use munitions manufactured with Thales manufactured TNT supports coalition forces interoperability.
The test plan established for the qualification of Thales TNT in collaboration with US Government representatives supported the following:
• Demonstration of the testing capability to MIL-DTL-248D for TNT Type I (Solid Flake with a solidification point of 80.20°C)
• Demonstration of other testing capabilities including functioning tests, sensitiveness determinations and other relevant characterisation tests
This presentation will detail the process that was undertaken to achieve this qualification and explore the chemical analysis to MIL-DTL-248D and the various energetic material qualification tests including performance tests.

Download Presentation

Mr Jakob Breiner
Munitions Safety Information Analysis Center (MSIAC)

Abstract

Drone like munitions (loitering munitions) combine ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) and target defeat capabilities in one single, affordable system. The conflicts of the last decade show the value of such versatile systems, often deployed in larger quantities no matter if airborne, on ground or seagoing. Many advantages of such systems are achieved by the high level of flexibility based on direct operator control via a two way datalink and autonomous functions (i.e. in case of datalink connection is lost, returning to last location with connection). In addition, the use of electric propulsion with disposable or rechargeable batteries provides the possibility to reuse such munition in case no appropriate target was identified within the operational endurance.

On the other hand, loitering munitions provide several challenges for safety and suitability for service assessments. Highly networked munitions require a holistic software, hardware and system safety assessments to ensure the required reliability level. Plus additional hardening is necessary to exclude hazards to the operators and own forces caused by enemy electronic warfare. Batteries (especially rechargeable variants) and energetic materials are challenging in combined storage and handling/transportation. Last but not least important, the arming logic of munitions with non-ballistic/pre-programmed trajectories and the reuse of a munition are discussed intensively by safety boards within NATO.

This presentation covers the munition specific safety challenges and the existing NATO standard framework. A S3 program is presented based on the existing standards for a basic, non-reusable airborne system to provide a baseline for further discussions and adaption to ground and seagoing munitions.

Download Presentation

Dr Ali Ameri
Directorate of Ordnance Safety, Defence
WGCDR Gary Gibbs
Royal Australian Air Force Reserve

Abstract

WGCDR Gary Gibbs1, Dr Ali Ameri1
1 Directorate of Ordnance Safety, Explosive Ordnance Branch, Department of Defence-Australia

Most of NATO nations currently uses Quantity-Distances (QD) principles to determine the separation distance between a Potential Explosive Site (PES) and an Exposed Site (ES) for the storage of munitions and explosives. The QD method's strength lies in its simplicity and relative ease of application, even with the introduction of the updated version of AASTP- 1. However, the QD method has several weaknesses, including its inflexible criteria that result in a 'Go/No-Go' situation, and unclear tolerable level of risk that ESs are exposed to. For the deployed missions and operations, NATO AASTP-5 recommends using Field Distances (FD) for storing munitions when QD rules cannot be met. FD method has similar weaknesses to the QD method.
To overcome some of these limitations with QD and FD principles, particularly in scenarios of noncompliance in respect to above-ground permanent storage and field storage, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is considering adopting a mix of qualitative and quantitative risk-based approaches. While it is acknowledged that the risk-based approaches are more complex than the QD approach, this paper aims to introduce a semi-quantitative risk analysis approach that correctly determines explosives risks, which ultimately helps site owners/commanders understand the risks and make informed licencing approval decisions. Additionally, the proposed approach aims to comply with the principles of SFARP.

Download Presentation

Dr Emma Coen
NIOA

Abstract

NIOA Munitions operates the Commonwealth Government Owned, Contractor Operated
munitions manufacturing facility in Benalla, Victoria, Australia. From 2017, NIOA operated at
Benalla under a sublease arrangement. In 2020, this transitioned from a sublease, to NIOA
being tenants in their own right. Since 2020, under a 10-year tenancy agreement (with
extension options), NIOA has enhanced this facility which spans primary explosives, large
calibre munitions, and pyrotechnics. Alongside advanced manufacturing capabilities, NIOA
manages multiple storage magazines for work-in-progress and finished goods. Located in
North-East Victoria, Benalla is pivotal in employing local talent in manufacturing, engineering,
and support roles, poised to significantly contribute to the Australian munitions market and the
regional economy.

In 2021, NIOA Munitions and RNM formed a joint venture to install and commission a cutting edge Medium Calibre Ammunition manufacturing line at Benalla. This state-of-the-art line
supports the production of 20mm to 40mm medium calibre munitions of various types. The
Commonwealth of Australia collaborated on modernizing the production building,
complementing NIOA's private investment, to optimize the Benalla Facility's potential.
The Medium Calibre Line is a Load, Assemble, Pack (LAP) facility, which is designed to
replicate the other RNM facilities. In order to achieve interchangeability of the munitions, commissioning, manufacturing and testing processes were developed in collaboration with RNM.

This briefing will delve into the challenges and successes of implementing, troubleshooting, and
commissioning this new manufacturing line in Australia. Challenges encompassed adapting to
differing electrical and safeguarding standards between Australia and Europe, logistical
complexities, and navigating pandemic-related impacts on commissioning efforts. Emphasis will
be placed on coordinating testing efforts for pilot lots, including overseas testing in the EU and
local testing by JPEU, as well as auxiliary support activities such as the installation of a remote
notching and drilling facility. Concluding insights will distil lessons learned throughout the commissioning and validation phases, while exploring prospects for additional product lines, focusing on diverse product
specifications.

Download Presentation

Dr Huon Bornstein
Thornton Tomasetti

Abstract

Facilities operated by the Australian Defence Force (ADF) that are licensed to hold Explosive Ordnance (EO) are subject to a set of criteria called Quantity Distance (QD) rules. These rules stipulate the appropriate stand-off distances for siting various facilities nearby such as other magazines, processing buildings, public traffic routes and buildings inhabited by the public. Thornton Tomasetti (TT) is currently developing a Field Deployable Explosive Siting and Licensing Tool (FDESLT) for Defence, which enables users to rapidly perform this analysis as well as incorporating a semi-Quantitative risk assessment framework for use cases where QD rules have not been achieved. Considering the recently formed Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance (GWEO) Enterprise, combined with the Commonwealth's increasing need to rapidly develop new and existing EO-based infrastructure, there is an ever-growing need to increase storage capacities of existing PES, and enable site layout optimisation for both new and existing sites based on novel means to ensure the Enterprise is meeting its new capability goals for GWEO.

While EO practitioners always aim to meet these QD requirements, it is understood that they can be conservative in nature and not achievable in all circumstances. While developing the FDESLT, TT has been engaged in discussions with the EO safety community around the feasibility of including natural terrain in the assessment. Thornton Tomasetti (TT) proposes three potential approaches to enhance EO site layout optimisation through the inclusion of natural terrain. These are; 1) Identification of typical geographical features on EO sites which represent a natural traverse 2) Develop a ruleset for natural geographical features akin to the rule set that is applied for traversed buildings in the QD ruleset, and, 3) Conduct CFD modelling of the actual site as part of a quantitative risk assessment.

This paper addresses each of these approaches and includes examples of the use of TT's in house GPU-based CFD solver WALAIR++ to assess the influence of natural terrain on EO safety distances.

Download Presentation

Mr Damion Hadcroft
QinetiQ Australia

Abstract

Explosive Ordnance (EO) safety management methods are inherently limited by the non-linear visco-elastic (NLVE) properties of energetic materials and the complex nature of their behaviour. These complexities include non-linear stress-strain relationships; time-temperature dependence; environmental sensitivities; and a potential for hysteretic heating to name a few.

In January 2024, Aerospace Explosive Ordnance Systems Program Office (AEOSPO) tasked QinetiQ Australia with researching the feasibility of modelling energetic materials. The task was to understand the feasibility of developing thermo-mechanical models of explosive fills within AEOSPO-managed items, including interface and container materials, with a view to predicting the fracture and heating of energetic components under a range of conditions.

This technical brief discusses a number of the findings from this research in addition to providing insight into the mechanical properties of energetic materials. Noteworthy examples of previous work on the modelling of energetic materials will be presented, and developments in modelling techniques for NLVE materials will be discussed.

The ability to model energetic materials has advanced in recent years. As such, modelling technologies may now offer a potential to provide valuable support information to strengthen EO surveillance outcomes, which could in turn assist with ensuring the ongoing safety of EO where interoperability and interchangeability imperatives exist.

Download Presentation

Mr Jakob Breiner
Munitions Safety Information Analysis Center (MSIAC)

Abstract

Recent armed conflicts demonstrated the efficiency of armed drones in attacking munition depots and storage facilities. No matter if the payload is dropped (unmanned combat aerial vehicle – UCAV) or is structurally integrated into the airframe (loitering munition), plenty of new systems have been seen on media. These range from very small systems (i.e. Defendtex D40) to large fixed wing systems (i.e. the Iranian Shahed 136 or the Yemeni Houthis Qasef-1), which can cover 1000 km or more to attack stationary targets with a very reasonable price tag when compared to a cruise missile. These systems expose a new level of threat to munition storage facilities as the quantity of attacks might rise by the low costs of such systems and, more importantly, the unique capabilities provide several advantages on the attack side. To assess the threat, six warhead mass categories of different lethal mechanisms (blast, fragmentation, penetration, and shaped charge jet) ranging from less than two to over 50 kg (overall mass) with representative effect characteristics have been studied. The estimated performance has been matched with the munition storage structure requirements of AASTP-1, as well as two specific ECM designs (Canadian CLSECM and the US Navy CLWS), to identify at which location the warheads might be successful in an attack. Finally, the warhead mass categories have been matched with payload capacities of representative loitering munition systems.

The generic results provide a sound overview of which type and size of drone/loitering munition is required to attack a munition storage facility at their specific weakest spot. The findings underscore the attack efficiency of those systems and suggest potential countermeasures for the munition storage structures.

Download Presentation

Flight Lieutenant Charlotte Watts
Royal Australian Air Force

Abstract

Current Explosive Ordnance (EO) safety risk communication methods do not enable practical, informed decision making in unpredictable operational environment. Currently, when changes to operational role or environment force risk decision makers to deviate from the established risk baseline, they lack available supporting technical analysis to inform immediate reassessment of risks. During high tempo operations, reaching back to engineering organisations is sometimes infeasible, and as a result, uninformed risk decisions are made in the form of Command Clearances. This leaves decision makers not reasonably informed to make tactical and strategic decisions in quick time required in upcoming rapidly emerging conflicts.

This paper explores improved methods of communicating EO safety risk mitigations and management options that enables decision makers to be reasonably informed in a flexible operating concept. This includes analysis and proposals of ways in which current risk communication methods can be improved, whilst still complying with the Explosive Safety Regulatory Framework and corresponding domain specific risk management frameworks.

Methods for communicating multiple mitigation and limitation option scenarios are investigated, whilst remaining in line with the So Far As Reasonably Practicable (SFARP) methodology of a single practicable solution. Multiple practicable solutions can be presented to operational decision makers to sufficiently inform them of alternative limitations and mitigations when deviation from the risk baseline becomes an operational necessity. This method still highlights that a single SFARP solution based on the understood operating concept for the EO item must be presented. As the assumptions and practicability of mitigations change in an emerging environment, these multiple recommended solutions, each outlined by particular cases in which they may be more practicable, enable the decision maker to remain informed in a constantly changing environment.

This paper explores ways to present these multiple options and provides generic examples of where this may be applied in an air-to-air combat scenario, in which previously affixed limitations cannot practicably be observed. This method can inform aircrew to better understand the unique consequences (safety, performance or mission risk) of EO risks on their mission, and associated residual risks attached to different levels of mitigations or limitations. From there aircrew are sufficiently informed as to which level of control and residual risk is most practicable to the current scenario. This will be presented in the form of a modified Explosive Munitions Branch hazard log. This new risk communication method was trialled in 2022 and received positive and constructive feedback from decision makers, hence the presented method will draw on lessons learnt and feedback from decision makers from this case study.

In summary, the paper will present a new way to communicate EO risks to decision makers. In the process of doing so, further improvements to the current risk communication methods and hazard templates will be proposed to closer align with modern Work Health and Safety (WHS) Law and EO/domain specific safety regulatory frameworks.

Download Presentation

Mr Warren Miller
QinetiQ

Abstract

This presentation is aimed at communicating software aspects of interoperability and interchangeability in the context of weapon systems. To be in a position to train, exercise and operate effectively together in the execution of assigned missions and tasks, entities must seamlessly, safely and securely interoperate through their interfaces, functions and behaviours. These entities exist at all hierarchical levels and may be systems (or parts thereof), units or forces. Should the need arise to interchange one entity for another, the replacing entity must also be able to suitably interoperate within the context of the assigned mission or task. The presence of software in entity interfaces and functions has continued to increase in scope and complexity since its introduction in the early guided weapons. How do we assure software suitably enables interoperability and interchangeability? This doesn't happen by accident. Therefore, it must be "baked into the cake". The presentation looks at several difference facets including open system architecture, common data links, safety engineering and security engineering.

Download Presentation

Lieutenant Commander Lachlan Bourke RAN
Directorate of Ordnance Safety, Defence

Abstract

Novel manufacturing processes are often adopted to reduce production time, material wastage or other associated costs; or to improve performance, reliability or safety . They may be used to produce energetic materials either in part (such as a 'pre-mix') or in full, or can be used to manufacture a component, assembly or a whole munition. Historically, manufacturing technologies used for the production of explosive ordnance were slow to evolve and thus we were able to gradually adapt standards, policy and procedures so that their intents remained met. With significant novel and disruptive manufacturing technologies currently in development, their anticipated future adoption calls into question some of the basic concepts associated with introduction of munitions into service, and management of those munitions through life. This presentation aims to provide awareness of potential future issues, and to generate discussion in support of identifying potential solutions and opportunities for a step change of abilities for in-service management of EO. Current in-service management aspects are introduced, and the relevance and challenges of concepts such as lotting and batching, in-service surveillance, and responses to accidents and incidents from an inventory management perspective discussed - with future opportunities presented.

Mr Anjum Rafiqi
Leospo / Gweo - Group
Mr David Seccombe
Thales Australia
Mr Chris Murray
Applied Explosives Technology

Abstract

Defence seeks to build stronger, more resilient and more internationally competitive sovereign Defence capabilities and secure supply chains for materiel. In alignment with the Australian Government strategic vision for enhancing Australian Industrial Capability, LEOSPO, in consultation with Australian Army, has embarked upon the pathway to switch to a more resilient supply chain for Explosive Ordnance identified for a 'technical refresh'. This is achieved through Domestic Manufacture, as opportunities present themselves, in alignment with Australian Army priorities and in collaboration with local industry partners.

LEOSPO has collaborated with Thales Australia and Applied Explosives Technology (AET), who are in an on-going strategic commercial relationship to deliver domestic solutions for EO under the Demolition and Breaching Explosives Program. This program aims to deliver a range of domestically manufactured explosive demolition and breaching explosives for the Australian Army.

This has been achieved through trail blazing a rapid prototyping/development/certification pathway for Australian manufactured demolition and breaching explosives in Australia. This presentation will open with an overview of the Demolition and Breaching Explosives Program, before detailing the pathway activities leading to the delivery of an Australian made Charge Demolition Bangalore Torpedo F60.
This presentation will be co-presented by LEOSPO, Thales and AET.

Download Presentation

Mr David Nink
NIOA
Mr Matthew Hampton
NIOA

Abstract

NIOA, as a tenant of the Benalla Government Owned Contractor Operated (GOCO)
manufacturing facilities, have recently installed and commissioned a Medium Calibre Load,
Assemble, Pack (LAP) manufacturing line with supporting elements for projectile fabrication.

The production line has been installed to support Australian Defence Force (ADF)
Medium Calibre requirements including export. Since the line's installation, NIOA and
Rheinmetall NIOA Munitions (RNM) have commissioned the line to fulfill export orders and
supply Cart 30mm Target Practice – Tracer (TP-T) ammunition to the ADF encompassing
preparation readiness to expand production to include war shot variants in differing calibres.

Critical to any manufacturing capability is a corresponding Test and Evaluation (T&E)
capability. T&E supports Research and Development, Production Line Qualification, and more
importantly ongoing Lot Acceptance Testing (LAT) to verify product performance prior to InService Acceptance.

This abstract seeks to explain the relationship between expanding manufacturing
capability and the corresponding T&E capability required, primarily, how they cannot be
approached independently without risk of the established manufacturing capability not able to
be adequately supported by the corresponding T&E capability. This paper is further intended to
provide a lead-in to how Australian defence industry can, through access to international best
practice, work with T&E providers (both government and private) to shape the future sovereign
T&E landscape to best support domestic manufacturing capability.

Download Presentation

Mr Raoul Mazumdar
Nova Systems
Mr Thinus Neethling
K39 Consulting

Abstract

Electrically initiated Explosive Ordnance (EO) contain one or more Electro-explosive Devices (EEDs), to fulfil a range of different functions. By design, an EED will function when exposed to an electrical firing stimulus with a suitable amplitude and duration. In (hot) bridgewire (BW) EEDs, initiation occurs due to the bridgewire heating effect i.e. heat from the resistive bridgewire initiates an energetic composition in contact with it.

Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance (HERO) is of particular concern due to the ability of electromagnetic (EM) energy to couple to an EED and its firing circuit, to cause inadvertent initiation of the EED, and its parent EO item. The consequences may be catastrophic, or may result in a temporary or enduring loss of capability.

The risks associated with HERO, a form of Electro-Explosive Hazard (EEH), can therefore be potentially detrimental to the ADF's interoperability objective.

A BW EED is arguably one of the most commonly-used EEDs and has traditionally been used as part of a worst-case, half-wave dipole antenna model to predict a theoretical HERO susceptibility trace. This trace allows for the calculation of Maximum Allowable Environment (MAE) data and minimum Safe Separation Distances (SSDs). In its basic form, the HERO susceptibility trace takes the form of a 'V' on a log-log scale. Of particular interest is the right-hand segment of the 'V', which shows that the MAE increases as the frequency increases.

New research has highlighted the likely limitations of the aforementioned right-hand segment of the HERO susceptibility trace and attributes it to the introduction and prevalence of high-power RF emitters in the K-, V- and W-bands. At these microwave frequencies, the BW HERO mechanism may not be the dominant failure mode. Instead the mechanism of initiation could be driven by (bulk) heating of the energetic material itself. Although data in this area is still sparse, available information indicates that energetic function is more likely to occur at a lower electromagnetic exposure and duration for increasing frequency. These effects are strongly coupled to the energetic composition and the all-up system design. In that respect, bulk heating may be carefully mitigated through design, or assessed through new standards of testing.

This paper details some of the latest available research on this topic, in order to drive informed decision-making for increasing the scope of test and evaluation, and for understanding a potentially hidden EM radiation hazard.

Download Presentation

Dr Nicholas Kanizaj
University of Sydney
MAJ Christopher Donaldson
UNSW
FLTLT Chase Shield
Royal Australian Air Force
FLTLT Julian Partridge
Royal Australian Air Force

Abstract

The Explosive Ordnance (EO) Masters and Grad Cert Programs at UNSW Canberra output graduates with a deep understanding of the science and engineering requirements of EO.

The equivalent of one year full-time study includes a capstone research project, in which students will generate novel work relevant to the EO field. We will discuss the programs and several current students within the program will present highlights of their research.

Download Presentation

Mr Roger Broughton
Thales Australia

Abstract

Thales Australia's cutting-edge X-ray capability at the Benalla facility plays a crucial role in meeting the evolving needs of the Defence industry. As the strategic priorities of Defence continue to emphasize the enhancement of sovereign capabilities and alignment with international partners for interchangeability/interoperability of solutions. The demands for higher sophistication in technology and non-destructive testing have significantly increased.

Non-destructive testing is indispensable for providing objective quality evidence to ensure compliance with specifications, global standards, and internal requirements for components and sub-components. Thales' X-ray capability provides results essential for risk mitigation, safety assurance, design, development, qualification, certification, investigations, as well as overall quality assurance, particularly for the increasingly sophisticated products demanded by the Australian Defence industry and their partners .

Thales employs qualified staff with Level 3 and Level 2 certifications in Radiograph Techniques to NAS-410 standards at the Thales Benalla facility. The transition from film-based imaging to digital technology has enabled higher quality imaging, faster processing, enhanced automation, as well as improved consistency and throughput in the imaging and reporting processes. This transition will also eliminate the need for chemicals as well as reduce the risks associated with legacy technologies.

Furthermore, as Australia aligns with more US technology and seeks to collaborate closely with international partners, the importance of having facilities capable of providing advanced support services has become evident. Thales' X-ray capability not only supports the local production of munitions for various countries but also ensures compliance with US radiography standards, facilitating easier expansion to other methods and products.

In conclusion, Thales' X-ray capability at the Benalla facility is well-positioned to meet the evolving needs of the Defence industry, offering advanced non-destructive testing services that align with global standards and support international collaboration and technology transfer that also permits Australian manufactured munitions to be used interchangeably by coalition nations both in training and conflict.

Download Presentation

Mr Rudi Bekker
NIOA
Mr Peter Schaumburg
NIOA

Download Presentation

Mr Raoul Mazumdar
Department of Defence

Abstract

Broadly speaking when investigating polymer bonded propellants, high-explosives, or nitrate ester propellants the area of chemical kinetics forms a valuable component in the pyrolysis and performance of said systems. If we are interested in the combustion of one material or the stabiliser depletion in another, applying the appropriate chemical kinetics scheme can allow us to understand the scaling or potential effects for performance and safety. The body of work reviews the significant growth in chemical kinetics, commercial packages, and the broad research progression in this space. It is clear that in the current state of art in chemical kinetics, modelling can support a vast array of technical challenges. These include nitrocellulose stabiliser depletion, munition toxicity upon function, and even allow for propellant formulation characterisation in burn rate modelling. Stabiliser kinetics can be expressed as overall global chemical Arrhenius rates, and have been applied for single base compositions stabilised with Diphenylamine (DPA). The usage of such chemical kinetic schemes are also supported by lifing documentation through AOP-48, which happens to recommend kinetic rate applications. More detailed chemical kinetic modelling comprising a few hundred reactions and species has also been implemented by research agencies for munition toxicity studies, and propellant performance characterisation for small arms munitions and rocket motor propellants. Another key underlining feature of chemical kinetics is the proliferation of commercial and open source tooling, and the ease of which zero and one-dimensional codes can be computed by standard desktop computing resourcing. The intersection of available chemical mechanisms, software and hardware means that engineers in this day and age can readily implement coding directed to various energetic formulations. This area is currently underutilised within the department, and presents a compelling case for the adoption for this manner of tooling for sustainment activities.

Download Presentation

Mr Adam Leer
QinetiQ Australia

Abstract

Design for Six Sigma for In-Service Surveillance: Revolutionising EO Lifecycle Management

In the ever-evolving landscape of defence technology, achieving superior quality and reliability in the development and production of Explosive Ordnance (EO) is paramount. Design for Six Sigma (DFSS) has long provided a robust framework for these goals, utilising statistical tools like linear regression and empirical research methods to integrate customer requirements and stringent design principles from the outset.

But let's pause for a moment and move past the development and production phase, fast-forwarding 10, 15, or even 20 years into the future. Industry has designed and manufactured state-of-the-art munitions. They've been rigorously tested, approved, and introduced into service, now safely stored in magazines. The question arises: So what? How do we ensure these munitions have remained reliable and safe as they age? and why DFSS can answer these question

Can DFSS, renowned for its effectiveness in production, be harnessed to enhance in-service surveillance and extend the service life of EO? The answer is a resounding yes. By applying DFSS to in-service surveillance, we can systematically obtain objective quality evidence to monitor the safety, reliability, and performance of EO throughout its operational lifecycle.

DFSS allows us to implement techniques such as Quality Function Deployment (QFD) to align surveillance activities with user needs and operational requirements, and Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) to proactively identify and mitigate potential degradation modes. Moreover, Design of Experiments (DOE) enables the optimisation of surveillance parameters, ensuring EO systems perform consistently under varied conditions. The DMADV (Define, Measure, Analyse, Design, Verify) framework supports continuous evaluation and improvement, fostering a robust verification and validation regime critical for in-service EO management.

Implementing DFSS in in-service surveillance not only sustains the reliability and effectiveness of EO but also identifies the early likelihood of failures, enhances confidence in safety, and supports the early detection of potential issues. This facilitates timely interventions and maintenance, ultimately ensuring high standards of quality and operational readiness. DFSS provides a comprehensive methodology that meets stringent safety and performance requirements, making it an indispensable tool in the lifecycle management of EO.

Join us as we explore how DFSS can transform the future of EO in-service surveillance, ensuring our munitions remain as reliable and safe decades from now as they are today.

Download Presentation

Dr Kevin Jaansalu
Munitions Safety Information Analysis Center (MSIAC)

Abstract

In considering a holistic relationship between the safety, performance, and longevity of a munition system, the relative importance of these factors depends on the viewpoint of the individual. In operations, safety may be better replaced by the concept of loss control, acknowledging that there is a task to be completed. Furthermore, performance when completing the task becomes inherently limited when considering control measures to prevent losses. Bounds to these losses have arisen naturally and are embodied in legislation. The performance of munitions is established in their design. After a review of a simple design process and related vocabulary, safety is seen as a constraint: legislated codes and contracted standards are constraints that the design must meet. This establishes the position of munition safety standards with respect to the performance goals of the munition. The consideration of constraints in a military context is subtly different than in a civilian one; yet trade-offs that arise between safety and performance can be addressed within the normal design process. A further description of standards is presented within the general categories of performance, codes of practice, and test methods. Overall, the processes to examine trade-offs for performance versus safety already exist in operations and in design.

Download Presentation

Mr Imran Shaik
Acor Consultants

Abstract

By examining case studies and practical applications of the standards, this presentation aims to provide valuable insights into effective safeguarding practices. Attendees will gain a deeper understanding of the importance of safeguarding in preserving the long-term viability of EO facilities and ensuring the safety of both Defence personnel and the public.

Download Presentation

Mr Lachlan Burgess-Orton
Defence Science and Technology (DST) Group

Abstract

Transport of EO (Explosive Ordinance) impacts the life of the system being transported, whether via air or land. In order to assess this vibration testing it is required to understand the environment and forces that the system is being subjected to.

It is common practice for any new platform to undergo vibration testing to understand its structural integrity, as well as validating computational models of the dynamic behaviour and perform validation and verification testing. On flying platforms this is commonly known as a Ground Vibration test (GVT), whereby accelerometers record the structural behaviour under a known excitation force imparted by modal shakers. This test is performed from full platforms to components, like EO.

Current techniques are based on a single axis force input, utilising multiple shakers to perform a Multi-Input-Multi-Output (MIMO) test, but there are considerable advantages in moving to multi-directional force inputs. Insight into future capabilities under development will be outlined, together with their benefits in terms of enhancing the life expectation of EO. This is becoming critical to provide a through-life support, i.e. less conservative life estimates from cradle to grave (manufacturing to end of life) of the EO, by developing more accurate vibration spectra with improved testing and environmental information.

Download Presentation

Mr Jacob Sheehy
Lockheed Martin Australia

Abstract

Product Agnostic Test Facilities to Support Safe Production of Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance Products in Australia

Testing capability is required for the development and qualification of an Australian supply chain to support guided weapons and explosive ordnance (GWEO) production in Australia. Once established, the GWEO supply chain will rely on test capability for independent failure review when a production issue is identified. Lockheed Martin Corporation's (USA) test capability standards are being used as a baseline of the investigation of capabilities in Australia. It has been determined that some capability exceeds the baseline standard of the USA while other capability requires further uplift.

Verification and Validation testing in Australia offers significant program schedule advantages and, looking into the future, will provide experience in testing required for in-country development. To support this, Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control engineering, is investigating existing test capability to ensure there is sufficient expertise to test guided weapons and explosive ordnance in Australia, and identify gaps where capability is lacking. Reach back to engineering in US program teams has helped to identify key areas for initial investigation, taking a product agnostic approach, but with an initial bias toward the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS). This approach promotes interoperability and interchangeability and can support not just Lockheed Martin products, but all future GWEO products as they emerge.

The capabilities being considered are housed in university, government and commercially owned facilities that can be used to independently qualify sub-systems and components and/or identify faults they may arise during production. Some capabilities are also vital in the rapid development of new products. Capabilities such as Highly Accelerated Life Testing and Highly Accelerated Stress Screening (HALT/HASS) can be used to very quickly identify weak points in the design of PCB's and other electronics assemblies, however this capability is rare to find in Australia.

Other capabilities help to understand the reliability and safety of a product or component. An example of this is x-ray imaging. Faults can be identified in energetic products such as solid rocket motors and war heads prior to testing to better understand the risks that may be associated with testing. A solid rocket motor fuel grain containing voids is highly likely to overpressure and rupture the casing resulting in damage to nearby facilities and potentially personnel. X-ray helps reduce this risk by providing an option for non-destructive inspection.
Capabilities currently under consideration includes the following:

- CT Scanning
- X-Ray
- Materials and Processing Laboratories
- Microscopy
- Electromagnetic Compatibility
- Centrifuge
- HALT/HASS
- Vibration & Shock
- Thermal Conditioning
- Energetics Laboratories
- Salt Mist, Rain, Ice, Sand, Temp
- Near Strike Lightning

The presentation will focus on the capability and gaps identified in the Australian industry and inform the viewers/listeners as to the current best practices employed by Lockheed Martin as they relate to guided weapons and explosive ordnance.

Download Presentation

Mr Chris Hollands
Munitions Safety Information Analysis Center (MSIAC)

Abstract

Energetic material qualification (EMQ) has been an important part of a munitions safety and suitability for service assessment since its introduction. The first promulgated standard for EMQ within NATO was STANAG 4170 edition 1 in 1985; a year later in 1986, the first edition of AOP-7 was promulgated, detailing a Manual of Tests for the Qualification of Explosive Materials for Military Use. Over the subsequent 30+ years only two further editions where promulgated, only in the very recent years has work been dedicated to these standards from their last promulgation in 2001.

This paper looks at the history of energetic material qualification, its origins and its purpose. MSIAC held Technical Meetings on the topics of EMQ in 2019, 2022 and most recently in 2024; these efforts are summarised against the background context of EMQ. Focusing on the challenges facing nations, such as increased pressures placed upon budgets, faster qualification, high intensity warfare and reliance on multinational supply chains or munition development programs – the impact on EMQ is discussed. A review of the current state is provided and opportunities for greater standardization identified.

Finally, it took in effect 25 years to update these important NATO documents, how to do better in the future, in order to address the continuous changes in the way energetic materials are developed and produced? Furthermore, is the current approach to EMQ commensurate with modern procurement / development programs and the need for "quicker and smarter" qualification activities? MSIAC has reviewed these important topics within its member nations and presents possible options for the future.

Download Presentation

Mr Rhys Centin
Thornton Tomasetti

Abstract

In order to align with the unique requirements of Explosive Ordnance (EO) siting and licensing while on deployment, the Directorate Ordnance Safety (DOS) has engaged Thornton Tomasetti (TT) to develop a Field Deployable Explosive Siting and Licensing Tool (FDESLT).

Partially inspired by SAFER (developed in the US), the FDESLT begun its development in 2023 out of the growing need for Commonwealth employees working in the EO safety sector to be able to rapidly develop or modify site plans, EO licenses and in general consider EO related risk in a more dynamic format than what is currently available. One of the key drivers for the FDESLT's creation as opposed to the employment of an existing product, is to provide a bespoke solution to the Department of Defence that can be managed and developed in conjunction with the ever-evolving requirements for EO safety in Australia. This paper will detail the development of the FDESLT and describe the enhancements currently being incorporated. The FDSLT was developed with a 'field deployable' mindset and as such, a key feature is to allow users to drag and drop both PES and ES in real time, with dynamic updates to the siting or licensing function that they are currently carrying out to assist in optimising the site layout in a rapid timeframe.

Future updates of the software package will enable users to use both rulesets from the eDEOP 101 as well as the AASTP series of publications. This will ensure that global best practice is being carried out when conducting siting and licensing of Commonwealth facilities which store EO. The software will also be able to conduct semi-quantitative risk assessments to give users an enhanced insight into the associated residual risk of PES-ES interactions where the stand-off distances are inside the recommended minimum as stipulated by a QD-based ruleset. Having a tool at operators' disposal which can rapidly inform decision makers of the residual risks associated with a given site plan can rapidly progress time-critical safety decisions in relation to field deployments or agile air-basing.

The paper will also explore other applications that the software could be used for, providing defence and other users with a field deployable tool which could be used for a range of risk-based activities.

Download Presentation

Wing Commander Lucas Ricciardi
Air Warfare Engineering Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force
Mr Andrew Dunstone
Royal Australian Air Force

Abstract

The rapid evolution of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) and the missions that they are expected to perform has seen Defence safety related policy being left behind. One just has to look at the battlefields of Ukraine and elsewhere to see the swift adoption of new and innovative applications of UAS technology including the use of ordnance.

Australia has been active in the area of adopting Weaponised UAS, often referred to as Loitering Munitions. With announcements of the acquisition of the Switchblade 300 Precision Loitering Munition and the Australian developed One-Way Loitering (OWL) munition there is a strong push within Defence to support agile, innovative and affordable development of UAS based capabilities. This includes support to local Australian industry and academia to provide a strong indigenous development and manufacturing base.

Traditionally weapons acquisitions have consisted of a long, highly planned drawn out process taking significant periods of time. The ordnance has been acquired from overseas sources through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) or contracting with large commercial enterprises. As part of the acquisition it is requested that all the extant qualification and safety data is provided to support Australian certification. These traditional projects are expensive, often buying a relatively small amount of munitions that stay in service for an extended period. To ensure the safe operation of test assets they are typically fitted with advance telemetry (TM) and Flight Termination Systems (FTS) that require coordinated test programs, often at great cost. This is compared to loitering munitions where affordability, quantity and speed to service with a minimum viable capability is a primary focus of programs.

The technical brief will be split into two parts. Part one will detail the safety issues that have already been identified during testing and trials with loitering munitions in the Australian context. It will cover challenges with the certification of ordnance in new environments, the difficulties with the generation and application of safe methodologies to support the conduct of operations and the current engagement with allied nations in this area. The second part of the brief will cover how Defence is planning to implement new methodologies to ensure the safe test and operation of loitering munitions whilst providing maximum operational utility to the system operators.
The brief will end with an open discussion about what has been presented and seek feedback on the concept being proposed. Being able to engage with the wider Ordnance community will bring awareness and debate about how to effectively implement new and novel uses of ordnance whilst still maintaining a safe environment IAW Australian Legislation.

Download Presentation

Mr Thinus Neethling
K39 Consulting

Abstract

The ADF faces increasingly complex and challenging problems to assure the Safety and Suitability for Service (S3) of complex and non-complex Explosive Ordnance (EO), especially at the dawn of the Guided Weapons and EO (GWEO) Enterprise.

Electrically initiated EO are of particular concern. This class of EO has one or more Electro-explosive Devices (EEDs) installed inside them, to fulfil a range of different functions. By design, EEDs will function when exposed to an electrical firing stimulus with a suitable amplitude and duration. Consequently, EEDs are susceptible to being inadvertently initiated when exposed to any Electro-explosive Hazard (EEH) such as Radio Frequency (RF) radiation, Electrostatic Discharge (ESD), or lightning, to mention but a few.

This paper focuses on a hazard that is related to RF/electromagnetic radiation, namely the RF-induced voltages in loop-type structures (e.g. cranes and EO handling equipment) when exposed to high incident electric fields.

Hazardous voltages in loop-type structures used for EO handling activities are considered to be disruptive and potentially detrimental to the ADF's interoperability and EO safety objectives. These voltages may be hazardous to personnel and electrically initiated EO, and have subsequently been recognised as a lifecycle threat in the GWEO Systems Division's EO Certification Basis (CB) and Requirements Verification Summary (RVS) Tool.

This paper addresses the related RF theory and the strategies for hazard assessment and control, especially with consideration to various extant RADHAZ control measures that may also be effective to reduce or eliminate the RF-induced voltages in loop-type structures.

Download Presentation

Mr Andrew Rouen
NIOA AU & NZ
Dr Warren Williams
JVAT
Mr Denzel Kapadia
JVAT

Abstract

This paper discusses the safety and suitability assurance considerations associated with a sovereign Loitering Munition (LM) store dropped from an existing Uncrewed Aerial System (UAS). This concept is used as basis of a case study to examine the relevant regulatory requirements impacting such EO-based LM systems, and to outline the systems safety methodologies and approaches that can be utilised to demonstrate compliance. The sovereign LM concept will utilise an existing Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) to carry an air-dropped store which is fitted with a warhead and a propulsion system option to provide a loitering or glide capability. This store forms part of a system comprising the carriage equipment and associated hardware and Stores Management Software (SMS) as a modular retrofit payload. The parent UAS will provide the long range required. As such this LM concept is representative of future capabilities encompassing EO and stores compatibility engineering essential for interoperability & interchangeability, and therefore provides a useful case study to examine emerging safety and suitability challenges faced by the Australian Defence Force (ADF).

Download Presentation

Ms Julie Green
GHD

Abstract

Within a modern Urban Operation Live Fire Facility (UOLFF) the airflow effect on weapons fire pollutants create an extremely complex, multi-phase, turbulent flow that varies with time. This multi-phase flow of turbulent air with firing particulates and gases must be sufficiently understood, so Facilities may be made safe for the frequent and extended training of soldiers. This understanding must inform future designs of internal geometry UOLFF spaces and the air ventilation systems design. A multi-phase flow experimental program was undertaken over more than three years to inform this design and safety challenge by using well-known and trusted multi-phase flow measurement techniques within desired floor plans. The aim was to gather reliable, relevant and "design useful" information as possible.

The modern UOLFFs internal multi-phase flow and mechanical ventilation system presents a complex and formidable problem for designers. The primary controlling fluid phase of this system is air, which is predominantly turbulent, in and around ventilation inlet ducts and occasionally laminar elsewhere. The nature of turbulent airflow means it is chaotic, never stationary and the turbulence may, at times reach anywhere in the UOLFF. Added to this is the weapons firing event, the rapid combustion of a wide range of explosive compounds. This introduces pollutants in the form of solid particulates and combustion gases. These pollutants spread far and wide throughout the UOLFF and their initial jet-like distribution depends on exactly where the soldier and weapon are located and orientated. Following pollutant injection, the particulates and gases quickly interact with the turbulent airflow, through the mechanisms of Stokes drag and gaseous diffusion respectively, which further distributes the pollutants throughout the UOLFF.

Such a complex multi-phase flow system introduces a level of chaos and variability. It is therefore difficult to set up consistent, repeatable experiments in which measurements can give clear and reliable guidance to designers. This also means it is very difficult, and perhaps unwise to try to draw "general macro-level conclusions and rules of thumb", about different layouts, training scenarios, weapon types and ventilation systems.

To this end, we have developed a multi-phase experimental program for UOLFF that applies statistically repeated measurements on precisely defined "real world" UOLFF geometries and layouts, with similarly precisely defined training scenarios and soldier movements.

This paper will present our multi-phase flow experimental program and discuss its approaches, measurements and the key decisions made in its development and testing. We discuss the techniques used to ensure the multi-phase measurements were statistically significant and representative of real UOLFF training and future state-of-the-art designs.

Results are given for two UOLFF geometry layouts and training scenarios. These are shown to be statistically stable measurements and results and a brief comparison with CFD Simulations shows good agreement. Future directions for this experimental testing program are discussed to inform future UOLFF design.

Download Presentation