Symposium Proceedings
Session 1A Regulation and Risk Management
A case study for modified QERA based on weighting factors for operational risk, mission urgency, personnel and asset protection.
Mr Rhys Centin
Thornton Tomasetti
Abstract
The 2026 release of the National Defence Strategy saw the Australian Government reiterate its commitment to the 2024 Australian Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance (EO) Plan. This plan saw clear guidance given to the Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance (GWEO) Group, highlighting clear goals with which to enhance Australia's readiness and preparedness in a deteriorating strategic environment. This includes building Defence's GWEO stocks, strengthening supply chains and supporting domestic manufacturing capability to ensure Defence has access to the stocks of EO it would need in a conflict. To meet these clear strategic targets domestically, enhancements need to be made to Australian's manufacturing basis, which also requires an increasing demand to enhance storage and transport capabilities to meet this increased manufacturing demand.
There is therefore an ever-growing need to rapidly assess greenfield sites for their capacity to manufacture and stow EO, highlight potential modifications that can be made to brownfield sites, which would enhance their storage, manufacturing, maintenance or handling capacities to align with Australia's strategic goals; as well as consider how EO storage and transport requirements will change based on mission, strategic and operational goals in theatre. In this paper, Thornton Tomasetti (TT) proposes a method which would seek to harmonise the current explosives siting and licensing approach under AASTP-1; with a dynamic weighting factor approach to safe stand-off distances applied during these activities. These weighting factors would be applied based on operational risk, mission urgency, and the levels of protection required to be provided to personnel and assets – both Defence and civilian.
To demonstrate how this proposed weighting factor method would work in practice, TT will put forward a set of case studies which will compare and contrast the differences between EO siting activities for storage and transport scenarios which provide candidates for situations where the inclusion of weighting factors would be appropriate for modifying EO siting and licensing requirements appropriately. These weighting factors will be directly linked to semi-Quantitative EO Risk Assessment (QERA) metrics of interests, to propose a framework which aligns with consequence and likelihood metrics from literature, and best informs decision makers as to the appropriate modification factors which can be applied to risk acceptance.
Session 1B Regulation
Australian regulatory approaches to explosives – lithium batteries
Mr James Robertson
Directorate Ordnance Safety
Abstract
Lithium batteries are an area of concern for those conducting hazard classification of explosives. New systems are employing larger Lithium Batteries in explosive articles. Key considerations affecting hazard classification of these systems will be covered. Some of these considerations include the battery's removability, suitability, system risks and required State Of Charge (SOC).
An overview of the proposed Commonwealth classification approach is provided. Under this approach, battery considerations may affect an article's final hazard classification and any associated caveats. Understanding these impacts to hazard classification will allow acquisition agencies, and those advising them, to better account for potential additional sustainment costs.
Session 2A Battery Technology / Safety and Suitability for Service
Comparison of lithium ion battery thermal threat and NATO standardised fast heating threat
Mr Jean-Francois Fournier
Munitions Safety Information Analysis Center (MSIAC), Belgium
Abstract
The main failure mode associated with the lithium-ion (Li-ion) battery technology is known as thermal runaway, which is a highly energetic reaction involving the violent combustion of flammable electrolytes. As there is an increase in use of Li-ion batteries within munition systems or in various applications used around munition systems, the hazards associated with thermal runaway must now be considered in the safety assessment of munition systems. This begs the question, how does the thermal threat associated with a Li-ion battery fire compare with NATO's insensitive munitions (IM) standardized fast heating (FH) threat, which was mainly defined by fuel fires.
This report presents an overview of the hazards associated with Li-ion batteries and summarizes the requirements for the IM standardized FH threat. Using results from characterization studies of Li-ion battery fires, a comparison is made between this threat and the requirements for the IM standardized FH threat. Expected temperatures from a standardized FH test are likely comparable to the average temperatures seen in Li-ion battery fires as the combustion of the flammable organic electrolyte, a hydrocarbon fuel fire, seems to be the main contributor of a Li-ion battery fire. Since Li-ion battery fires temperatures can range from approximately 550°C to 1500°C the standardized FH test may not replicate the maximum temperatures and other potential consequences that can result from this new threat.
Insensitive high explosives qualification
Ms Elizabeth Francois
Los Alamos National Lab (US)
Abstract
Insensitive High Explosives (IHE) are a realm of high explosives (HE) that have gained acceptance with the USA in warhead applications. The reason for widespread acceptance is the belief that explosives in this category are insensitive any sort of insult imaginable. Only one high explosive; and two formulations have achieved this qualification. The expectation of most non-HE experts is that these explosives act like "wood".
Over time, other HEs are developed, some with very favorable characteristics, that may place them in the realm of IHE. What the qualification entails, what
the pitfalls of this test series include, and the overarching expectation of what an IHE buys a weapon system will be discussed.
The US approach to high explosive qualification will be contrasted with other methods: notably AOP 7 and the IM testing regime. Unfortunately all have different requirements adding to the complexity.
Session 2B Regulation and Risk Management / Battery Technology
Proportional Approach to Weapon System Software Safety Engineering
Mr Warren Miller
DDG GWEO Systems Division DENG
Abstract
This presentation examines the latest edition of AOP-52, Software Safety Requirements for Design and Assessment of Munition-Related Computing Systems, which has evolved from a guidance publication into a NATO standard. It also introduces associated guidance addressing the safety implications of loitering munitions and artificial intelligence (AI).
The new edition of AOP-52 establishes a standardized framework for the development and assessment of software, firmware, and programmable logic devices that contribute to the safety of munition systems employed by NATO member and partner nations. By providing a common methodology for understanding and evaluating software-related hazards and risks, the standard enhances interoperability, supports the exchange of munitions between allied armed forces, and promotes a consistent approach to software safety assurance. Central to this framework is a proportional approach to software safety engineering, where the level of rigor applied is commensurate with the potential risk posed by the software.
The increasing integration of AI-enabled functionality within munition systems presents new safety challenges that traditional software assurance approaches do not fully address. To address these challenges, the latest edition of AOP-52 introduces a Standards Referenced Document (SRD), Guidance on the Use of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning in Munition-Related Computing Systems. This guidance proposes system safety analysis processes, enhanced levels of rigor, and technical considerations for identifying hazards and managing risks associated with supervised machine learning (ML) applications in munition systems. It provides a structured approach to mitigating system safety risks throughout the development, testing, and operational use of munitions incorporating supervised ML functionality.
This presentation will discuss the principles underpinning the proportionality framework within AOP-52, its application to software safety engineering, and the emerging considerations for assuring the safe integration of AI and ML technologies in weapon systems.
Integrating Innovation without Compromising Safety - Battery Energy Storage System Consequence Modelling
Mr Alex Waugh
AMOG Consulting
Abstract
The recent conflict in Iran and the associated impact on global fuel supplies highlight the advantages of systems such as Micro-Grid-Scale Battery Energy Storage System (BESS) technology. BESS technology offers substantial benefits including increased backup reliability and reduced dependence on hydrocarbon fuels and the associated fuel supply chains to power backup generators. The opportunities presented by emerging technologies such as BESS are balanced by a new set of safety challenges, which need to be considered and addressed proportionately.
Session 2C Regulation and Risk Management
Beyond simple numbers – the critical importance of accurate TNT equivalency in international explosives safety
Mr Troy Gardner
Safety Management Services (US)
Abstract
TNT equivalency remains one of the most widely used, yet most frequently
misunderstood, metrics in explosives safety. It forms the basis of quantity-distance (QD) calculations, facility siting, infrastructure protection, and risk assessments that directly affect personnel, national assets, and public populations. Despite its operational importance, many organizations continue to rely on oversimplified single-value equivalencies that do not accurately reflect the physics of explosive behavior. Such practices risk underestimating blast effects, reducing separation distances below safe thresholds, and placing critical assets and communities at increased hazard. Overestimation of equivalency, while less immediately dangerous, imposes unnecessary operational limitations and undermines international harmonization.
This presentation provides a concise examination of why accurate, configuration-specific TNT equivalency is essential for modern explosives
safety practice. Through examples drawn from established blast-effects criteria and accident-prevention principles, it highlights the strong influence of charge geometry, initiation configuration, surface conditions, and waveform fidelity on blast output. The discussion clarifies why no material possesses a universal, constant TNT equivalency and why simplified methods—though operationally appealing—are technically invalid and potentially dangerous.
The presentation concludes with recommendations for the international
community, emphasizing the need for scientifically based methods, coordinated data practices, and consistent reference standards. This session is designed for both technical specialists and decision-makers, framing accurate TNT equivalency as a shared global responsibility and a cornerstone of modern explosive-risk management.
Session 3A Manufacturing
Applying digital engineering to support the introduction into service of complex GWEO systems
Miss Josephine Matthias
Australian Missile Corporation
Abstract
In an effort to derisk Introduction Into Service (IIS) of complex Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance (GWEO), AMC and Defence are developing a bespoke vibration and thermal testing capability which aims to replicate real-world operational carriage environments. Known as the Multiple-input, Multiple-output Vibration System, or MIMOVS, this capability seeks to improve on existing vibration approaches at in-service Defence test sites.
Due to the intrinsic complexity of a MIMOVS, such capabilities have historically been difficult to develop from design through to commissioning. Work being undertaken by AMC and Defence is nearing the completion of the Design Phase, with the application of Digital Engineering practices to address the inherent complexity whilst maintaining rapid development. Importantly, Defence has benefited from the AMC industry-standard Digital Engineering approaches, which has improved on configuration management, stakeholder awareness and engagement, and agility to align with Defence Science and Technology's research in this emerging capability development. In short, the Digital Engineering approach is considered to be an important risk mitigation approach to project, scope, schedule and cost risks, as the MIMOVS capability enters into the fabrication and integration stage.
AMC and Defence continue to work on the MIMOVS capability that will seek to gather data to improve GWEO availability, as well as support future RDT&E efforts as the GWEO domestic manufacturing base expands.
Building a sovereign rocket – Development of the Koonibba Rising vehicle and performance capabilities of a wholly Australian sounding rocket
Mr Christopher Norton
Southern Launch Australia
Abstract
The Advanced Rocket Motor Technology Demonstrator (ARMTD) program has proven successful in developing a military relevant solid rocket motor demonstrated in a ground-based static firing environment however, to properly validate operational function rocket motors need to be demonstrated in flight.
Southern Launch in conjunction with DST has subsequently developed a highly capable sounding rocket, the Koonibba Rising Rocket (KRR), based around the Koonibba Rising (KR) solid rocket motor. The KRR vehicle utilised Southern Launch's position as both a range and launch service provider to develop a launch vehicle capable of supporting a variety of payloads from a variety of launch infrastructure solutions, operating in a variety of environments.
Following significant design and qualification testing between 2021 and 2025, including the development and manufacturing of a vehicle to support a smaller flight motor, the KRR vehicle's multiyear development journey was completed with the first flight during June 2026. At which time KRR and its associated configurations will be ready to service the demand for defence relevant high-speed flight testing. An overview of the development of the flight vehicle and its performance capabilities is presented.
Session 3B Storage and Distribution
Proportionality in Exclusion Zones: A Physics-Based Method for Assessing Projectile Hazards from Underground Ammunition Storage Facilities
Dr Edward Gan
Kellogg Brown and Root Australia
Abstract
Projectile hazards from accidental explosions in underground ammunition storage facilities are commonly assessed using established quantity-distance guidance. The AASTP-1 adit-debris model (Swiss method) defines a clover-shaped Inhabited Building Distance contour based principally on the net explosive quantity and the geometry of the adit section behind the portal. This provides a practical basis for establishing safety distances around underground ammunition storage facilities, but does not explicitly model the transient blast jet or the trajectories of specific objects. Consequently, it provides limited information on which objects govern the hazard, where they may impact, and the velocity and kinetic energy retained at impact. A physics-based projectile assessment approach can provide additional resolution to support more proportional safety decisions for defence explosives facilities. This paper presents a physics-based projectile assessment methodology developed through an experimental and computational research programme conducted at the University of Wollongong. The experimental programme used the Advanced Blast Simulator, with a 0.3 m by 0.3 m cross-section, to reproduce blast waves, end jets and projectiles expelled through an underground portal. Pressure and flow-loading histories were measured outside the portal at several locations to characterise the development and decay of the jet downstream of the portal. Generic and geometrically scaled representative objects, spanning a range of masses, shapes, and drag characteristics, were tested to investigate launch behaviour, trajectory, directional spread, and travel distance. The experimental findings were used to develop in-house computational scripts coupling transient jet loading with projectile flight mechanics. The model tracks the changing interaction between each projectile and the evolving jet field. A projectile may remain within the jet, pass above or outside the jet column, and subsequently re-enter the flow as its trajectory and the jet boundaries evolve. By varying object geometry, mass, drag coefficient and initial conditions, the method generates projectile flight paths, impact locations, impact velocities, kinetic energies and directional impact footprints.
The methodology is applied to representative underground ammunition storage scenarios based on the tunnel and chamber geometry investigated by Joachim (1990). The experimental configuration is reproduced using Viper::Blast computational fluid dynamics (CFD) simulations to characterise the transient blast jet beyond the portal, with the simulated flow histories applied to the in-house projectile model. Three net explosive quantities are investigated using the same geometry, including a reference case of 22 tonnes TNT equivalent corresponding to Joachim's full-scale experiment. The predicted projectile footprints are superimposed on the AASTP-1 clover-shaped adit-debris contour and compared with the experimental projectile ranges reported by Joachim. The comparison examines the overall range and directionality predicted by each approach, while demonstrating how the hazard depends on the credible object inventory, net explosive quantity and transient jet characteristics. For a representative storage facility with a net explosive quantity of 22 tonnes TNT equivalent, the proposed method predicted a maximum range of 3,223 m for a 27.7 kg steel cube positioned within the access tunnel near the portal, compared with 2,352 m in Joachim's experimental programme. The predicted range exceeds the 712 m maximum axial range given by the AASTP-1 clover contour line by a factor of approximately 4.5. These results demonstrate that object-specific projectile behaviour can extend well beyond the AASTP-1 adit-debris contour and should therefore be explicitly considered when defining exclusion zones. The proposed framework is intended to complement established quantity-distance guidance. It enables new or site-specific objects to be assessed, identifies the projectiles controlling the hazard, and provides information on residual impact severity and potential mitigation measures.
Investigation of quantitative explosive risk assessment approaches applicable to selected storage and transport scenarios of explosive ordnances in the ADF
FLTLT Franz Pulikkottil
Royal Australian Air Force
Abstract
Explosive Ordnance (EO) storage and transport activities present inherent safety, security, and societal risks that must be managed through robust regulatory frameworks and risk assessment methodologies. Within the Australian Defence Force (ADF), Explosive Risk Management (ERM) is primarily governed by Defence Explosive Ordnance Publications (DEOP) and the Australian Code for the Transport of Explosives by Road and Rail (AE Code). For EO storage involving Net Explosive Quantities (NEQ) greater than 50 kg, risk management relies largely on prescriptive Quantity Distance (QD) rules, while transport risk is addressed through compliance-based AE Code requirements. This research investigates the adequacy of these approaches and evaluates the application of Quantitative Explosive Risk Assessment (QERA) as a supplementary method aligned with PARARI 2026 reporting standards.
The study applied a realistic ADF scenario involving road transport of selected explosives between RAAF Base Williamtown and Singleton Military Area in New South Wales, followed by storage at the destination. Three representative EO types and quantities were assessed. The methodology integrated regulatory compliance analysis with analytical risk tools, including hazard classification, compatibility assessment, QD calculations, QERA for storage and transport, MIL-STD-882E–aligned qualitative risk assessment, and geographic information system (GIS)–supported safe route analysis.
Results demonstrate that while QD provides an effective consequence mitigation mechanism, it does not quantitatively characterise individual, potential, or societal risk. QERA application supplements QD by explicitly quantifying these risk dimensions, improving transparency and supporting risk decisions consistent with so far as is reasonably practicable (SFARP) principles. For transport, the AE Code was found to be robust in ensuring compliance-related controls; however, it does not explicitly consider societal exposure along transport routes. A tailored QERA application enables estimation of individual and societal risk across en-route regions, improving transport risk visibility.
The study also identifies the absence of a prescribed Defence method for evaluating en-route safety and security risks. GIS-based assessment incorporating population density, traffic accident history, and crime data provided a practical means of identifying lower-risk routes and reducing exposure.
The research concludes that integrating QERA with existing prescriptive controls enhances EO storage and transport risk management. It recommends mandating QERA to supplement QD for NEQ greater than 50 kg, extending DEOP guidance to support QERA use in transport scenarios, and further developing GIS-enabled safe route methodologies in alignment with PARARI 2026 expectations.
Session 3C Safety and Suitability for Service
Energetic material qualification requirements
Dr Khuong Vuong
Directorate of Ordnance Safety (Department of Defence)
Abstract
Sovereign manufacturing of munitions including energetic material is a key capability contributor to the 2024 and 2026 National Defence Strategy. The number and variety of Made in Australia energetic materials (EM) is expected to increase significantly to support capabilities being developed.
Energetic materials produced in Australia and used by the Australia Defence Force (ADF) are required to be qualified by the Australian National Authority (ANA) for Energetic Material Qualification (EMQ). Australia's policy for EMQ are captured in DEOP 102, Part 2, Annex 9A and are well aligned with NATO STANAG 4170/ AOP-07 standards. In 2024, the Directorate of Ordnance Safety (DOS) issued an Explosives Safety Advisory Circular (ESAC) advising stakeholders of recommended tests for EMQ for various class of energetic materials to support acquisition parties when procuring explosive ordnance.
This presentation will address triggers for EMQ, EMQ process, how to make use of recommended tests, applications of EMQ test results in filling of munitions and introduction to service certification. Examples from recently completed EMQ programs will be used to illustrate the discussion.
RF Shielding Effectiveness of Metal Ammunition Boxes in EO Safety Applications
Mr Prodip Ghosh
Directorate of Ordnance Safety (Department of Defence)
Abstract
The protection of electrically initiated EO from RF environments remains a critical consideration for EO safety and HERO (Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance) management. Established guidance suggests that HERO UNSAFE ordnance may be rendered safe through complete enclosure within a sealed, all-metal container. However, this assertion relies on implicit assumptions regarding the electromagnetic behaviour of such enclosures, which are not always interrogated in operational contexts.
The presentation examines the RF shielding effectiveness (SE) of Boxes Ammunition Metal (BAMs), challenging the notion that they inherently behave as ideal Faraday cages. It explores the distinction between ideal and non-ideal enclosures, highlighting how real-world factors—such as seams, apertures, material properties, and ageing—degrade shielding performance. A key focus is the frequency-dependent nature of SE and the impact of cavity resonances within metallic enclosures, which can produce significant reductions in shielding at discrete frequencies.
Drawing on measured SE data for representative BAMs, it is demonstrated that shielding performance is neither uniform nor reliably conservative across frequency bands. Observed phenomena include resonance-driven dips in SE, and in some cases, performance approaching free-space transmission (0 dB), undermining assumptions of protection. The limitations of typical test methodologies—such as sparse frequency sampling and reliance on single-unit testing—are also discussed, emphasising the need for conservative interpretation of results within safety cases.
The presentation further considers the implications of these findings for HERO classifications, particularly the transition from HERO UNSAFE to HERO SAFE when an EO item is packaged. It argues that BAMs alone may not consistently provide sufficient attenuation to guarantee safety under all operational RF threat environments. As a practical mitigation strategy, the use of supplementary RF barrier materials as inner packaging is presented, including their characteristics, limitations, and contribution to overall system-level shielding effectiveness.
Ultimately, the presentation seeks to improve technical understanding and risk-informed decision-making for EO storage and transportation. It advocates for a more nuanced treatment of shielding assumptions, encourages robust SE testing and/or analysis practices, and highlights pragmatic pathways to enhance protection without necessitating costly redesign of existing containers.
Session 4A Storage and Distribution
How nations apply TNT equivalency in QD frameworks: Balancing simplicity and scientific accuracy
Dr Socrates Angelides
Munitions Safety Information Analysis Center (MSIAC), Belgium
Abstract
By expressing the effects of a wide range of energetic materials relative to TNT, practitioners can apply established Quantity Distance (QD) relationships through a simplified and broadly understood framework. However, as the understanding of explosive phenomena has advanced, and as the diversity of military munitions has increased, questions have emerged regarding the appropriate application of TNT equivalency and the extent to which simplified conversion methods accurately represent explosive effects. These questions have become particularly relevant within NATO, where interoperability requires consistent approaches across nations while recognising differing national practices and risk tolerances.
This presentation examines the evolution of TNT equivalency within NATO ammunition safety policy and investigates the factors that led to the removal of TNT equivalency tables from AASTP-1. Particular attention is given to the publication of AASTP-4 and its role in providing a more technically rigorous framework for evaluating explosive effects. A further area of discussion concerns the relationship between TNT equivalency and Net Explosive Quantity (NEQ). Across NATO nations, differing interpretations exist regarding whether NEQ values already incorporate TNT-equivalent mass adjustments or whether additional TNT equivalency factors should be applied when conducting QD assessments. The presentation reviews these interpretations and examines the implications of each approach on storage safety.
The presentation also highlights the challenges faced by practitioners when attempting to apply a technically correct methodology while maintaining a practical and usable framework for routine QD determinations. A particular difficulty lies in accounting for TNT equivalence across explosives belonging to different Hazard Divisions. Furthermore, it is important to recognise that methodologies developed for blast-related TNT equivalence are not necessarily applicable to other explosion effects, such as fragmentation and debris, progressive events, or thermal hazards, each of which may require separate consideration. To better understand the current landscape, the presentation compares how individual NATO nations address TNT equivalency for QD purposes. Some nations favour simplified methodologies that promote consistency and ease of application, while others adopt more detailed approaches that seek to better represent the physical effects of specific energetic materials. These differing philosophies often reflect varying national risk tolerances and operational requirements.
The findings demonstrate that, despite a common desire for interoperability, establishing a single, universally accepted, and easy-to-apply method for determining TNT equivalency remains extremely challenging. The difficulty stems from the fact that nations approach the issue differently, reflecting varying risk tolerances and preferences for either simplified or more detailed methodologies. As a result, achieving complete harmonisation requires balancing scientific accuracy with usability, while ensuring that any adopted approach remains practical for governments, military organisations, and manufacturers alike.
Applying a Whole Body of Evidence Approach to Hazard Classification
Mr James Robertson
Directorate Ordnance Safety
Abstract
UN Test Series 4 and 6 provide evidence used by Hazard Classifiers to determine if an explosive article is stable and what Hazard Division it should be assigned to. The series includes tests for thermal stability, 12 m drop, sympathetic reaction and fast heating. These tests are full scale and expensive to conduct, especially on more complex systems. Additionally, tests are only required to be conducted a small number of times which reduces the confidence that can be placed in results.
With a small number of full-scale tests, gaining an understanding of the expected result is useful. This presentation provides an overview of how Australia applies a Whole Body of Evidence (WBE) approach to these assessments in order to make better Hazard Classification decisions. The WBE may include, but is not limited to, evidence from areas such as small-scale testing, expert judgement, statistical modelling and physical/chemical simulations. The approach also leverages guidance provided in the Hazard Assessment Protocols from NATO Standard AOP-4864.
Session 4B Manufacturing
NIOA Benalla Industrialisation – Primary Explosives Manufacturing Part 1
Dr Emma Coen
NIOA
Mr Sam Brugliera
NIOA
Abstract
Part 1 – Capability Establishment
NIOA operates within its tenancy at the Commonwealth Government Owned, Contractor Operated (GOCO) munitions manufacturing facility in Benalla, Victoria, Australia. From 2017, NIOA operated at Benalla under a sublease arrangement. In 2020, this transitioned from a sublease, to NIOA being tenants in their own right. Since 2020, under a 10-year tenancy agreement (with extension options), NIOA has enhanced this facility which spans primary explosives, medium calibre munitions, large calibre munitions, and pyrotechnics. Alongside advanced manufacturing capabilities, NIOA manages multiple storage magazines for work-in-progress and finished goods. Located in North-East Victoria, Benalla is pivotal in employing local talent in manufacturing, engineering, and support roles, poised to significantly contribute to the Australian munitions market and the regional economy.
In 2025, NIOA commenced manufacture of a number of primary explosives and associated products. The manufacture of primary explosives is inherently hazardous, and requires stringently defined and controlled manufacturing processes. The entire manufacturing process requires a precise understanding of the process from raw material procurement, to solution preparation and other manufacturing activities. NIOA Munitions has also established laboratory testing capability to perform in-process and finished product testing on the suite of primary explosives.
This briefing will delve into the challenges and successes of implementing, troubleshooting, and commissioning this new manufacturing line in Australia. Challenges encompassed sourcing raw materials, and developing the technical know-how to safely manufacture and characterise primary explosives.
Concluding insights will distil lessons learned throughout the commissioning and validation phases.
Part 2 – Safety Approach and Validation
This technical brief charts the endeavour undertaken to re-establish the manufacture of primary explosives notably RD 1347, Dextrinated Lead Azide and Lead Styphnate within the NIOA tenancy at the Commonwealth Government Owned, Contractor Operated (GOCO) Benalla munitions manufacturing facility. It maps the journey of resurrecting a manufacturing base via the application of proportional safety. It presents the road map used to source raw ingredients, re-certify and re-commission plant & equipment and establish process to manufacture primary explosives so that they meet current safety regulations and legislation.
The Benalla munitions manufacturing facility is Australia's premier explosive ordnance manufacturing capability. Established in 1995 as a consolidation of a number of since decommissioned GOCO facilities, the newly built Benalla facility was predominantly furnished with plant and equipment relocated from these decommissioned sites including some of the plant and equipment dating back to the 1950s.
Over the past 30 years the post-cold war peacetime rationale adopted by western nations has led to explosive ordnance manufacturing capabilities becoming dormant and outdated. The growing instability and deterioration of of the global security environment has led to increased demands for explosive ordnance, exposing shortages in the critical feed stock and supply chain bottlenecks, further asserting the need to reestablish a sovereign industrial base for explosive ordnance.
Reestablishing the industrial base is more challenging than is generally perceived. The sad truth is that the individuals who held the knowledge and intellectual nous are at best retired or at worst long departed. Documented information may exist however gaps in non-documented knowledge base are profound, exposing people and organisation to unwarranted risk.
Further complicating the reestablishing of the industrial base is our past knowledge that was grounded in processes which were struck in a world which had little requirements or perception of safety. These processes now need to contend with the challenges of satisfying operating in an escalated safety regulatory environment with more readily access to robotics and automation.
How do we do this when we are working with plant and equipment that is sometimes seventy years old and does not meet any currently accepted standard? How do we do this utilising manufacturing processes which are so antiquated that it exists as a historical document within the British National Archives? How do we do this when the undocumented knowledge base lives in hibernation mode of a pensioner.
The cornerstone of the application of proportional safety to the reestablishing of primary explosives production was to broadly apply the principal of a grossly disproportional argument, to what we have, to what we need, to what can be done and to what is acceptable. The grossly disproportional argument provided the safety reasoning for whether a mitigation may be, could be or should be implemented. The determination comparing the potential gain in safety with the practicality, time constraints and cost associated with implementing the mitigation led to the successful synthesisation of primary explosives at the Benalla munitions manufacturing facility.
NIOA Benalla Industrialisation – Primary Explosives Manufacturing Part 2
Mr Sam Brugliera
NIOA
Abstract
Part 2 – Safety Approach and Validation
This technical brief charts the endeavour undertaken to re-establish the manufacture of primary explosives notably RD 1347, Dextrinated Lead Azide and Lead Styphnate within the NIOA tenancy at the Commonwealth Government Owned, Contractor Operated (GOCO) Benalla munitions manufacturing facility. It maps the journey of resurrecting a manufacturing base via the application of proportional safety. It presents the road map used to source raw ingredients, re-certify and re-commission plant & equipment and establish process to manufacture primary explosives so that they meet current safety regulations and legislation.
The Benalla munitions manufacturing facility is Australia's premier explosive ordnance manufacturing capability. Established in 1995 as a consolidation of a number of since decommissioned GOCO facilities, the newly built Benalla facility was predominantly furnished with plant and equipment relocated from these decommissioned sites including some of the plant and equipment dating back to the 1950s.
Over the past 30 years the post-cold war peacetime rationale adopted by western nations has led to explosive ordnance manufacturing capabilities becoming dormant and outdated. The growing instability and deterioration of of the global security environment has led to increased demands for explosive ordnance, exposing shortages in the critical feed stock and supply chain bottlenecks, further asserting the need to reestablish a sovereign industrial base for explosive ordnance.
Reestablishing the industrial base is more challenging than is generally perceived. The sad truth is that the individuals who held the knowledge and intellectual nous are at best retired or at worst long departed. Documented information may exist however gaps in non-documented knowledge base are profound, exposing people and organisation to unwarranted risk.
Further complicating the reestablishing of the industrial base is our past knowledge that was grounded in processes which were struck in a world which had little requirements or perception of safety. These processes now need to contend with the challenges of satisfying operating in an escalated safety regulatory environment with more readily access to robotics and automation.
How do we do this when we are working with plant and equipment that is sometimes seventy years old and does not meet any currently accepted standard? How do we do this utilising manufacturing processes which are so antiquated that it exists as a historical document within the British National Archives? How do we do this when the undocumented knowledge base lives in hibernation mode of a pensioner.
The cornerstone of the application of proportional safety to the reestablishing of primary explosives production was to broadly apply the principal of a grossly disproportional argument, to what we have, to what we need, to what can be done and to what is acceptable. The grossly disproportional argument provided the safety reasoning for whether a mitigation may be, could be or should be implemented. The determination comparing the potential gain in safety with the practicality, time constraints and cost associated with implementing the mitigation led to the successful synthesisation of primary explosives at the Benalla munitions manufacturing facility.
Session 4C Safety and Suitability for Service
Reframing minimum viable capability in explosive ordnance engineering
Mr Christopher Donaldson
Land Explosive Ordnance System Program Office, GWEO
Abstract
The Australian Defence Force (ADF) operates under acute strategic pressure to deliver Explosive Ordnance (EO) at far greater speed and scale than the current engineering process has been able to achieve. Australia's Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance (GWEO) Enterprise endeavours to deliver on governmental mandate to accelerate acquisition, with the concept of Minimum Viable Capability (MVC) anchoring processes. MVC is meant to prioritise the rapid introduction of operational capabilities over the pursuit of near-perfect technical solutions.
This technical paper examines the utility and progress of MVC within the existing architecture of the GWEO Engineering Management System (EMS). It argues that the popular assumption that we can simply increase engineering personnel or resources to overcome delays or technical integrity constraints is fundamentally flawed. Additionally, and counter to its current application, it identifies that MVC is not a decision to be made retrospectively for the delivery of sub-standard capabilities due to the resource restrictions experienced by a project already in delivery.
This technical paper will map the points of friction between the governmental MVC direction and GWEO EMS practice. It begins with an analysis of the GWEO EMS, before assessing government conceptions of MVC and exploring some comparative approaches to rapid munitions fielding. This paper concludes that the sustainable acceleration of EO capability depends on reframing the underlying logic of MVC. Findings of this research are relevant to Defence's broader ability to deliver capabilities to the ADF at the pace demanded by Australia's contemporary strategic circumstances.
A Data-Driven Approach to Missile Captive Carriage Lifing
Ms Mary Massiha
QinetiQ
Abstract
Introduction
Munitions Health Management (MHM), as defined in AOP-4844, is a support process to In-Service Surveillance (ISS) that assesses the condition of munitions throughout their lifecycle. Unlike traditional approaches that rely on qualification assumptions, MHM leverages actual usage and environmental exposure data to optimise the assessment of a munition's life. This data-driven approach enables operators to make informed decisions on munition management, with a view to achieving improved safety, reduced costs and sustained capability.
Several NATO nations have published MHM case studies. Among these is a UK MoD case study, termed the Munitions Environmental Lifing Programme (MELP). This programme leverages existing airframe fatigue monitoring and environmental qualification data to provide the evidence for a more accurate assessment of the consumed Captive Carriage (CC) life of individual missiles.
QinetiQ has developed a similar MHM methodology, modelled on this approach, which provides an alternative, optimised method for tracking the CC life of a missile carried on an RAAF aircraft.
Problem Statement
Under the conventional qualification and lifing approach currently adopted by the RAAF, missiles are certified for carriage on aircraft for a fixed number of CC hours. This limit is established during certification based on a defined set of usage assumptions and environmental exposures.
This approach treats each air carriage hour as equal in terms of damage i.e. one hour of CC flight consumes one hour of the CC life limit. It is widely recognised that this is not always the case, as different operational scenarios can vary significantly in severity and therefore consume missile life at different rates. Nevertheless, this approach remains acceptable provided that actual operational usage is consistent with (or enveloped by) the qualification usage assumptions over the missile's service life. A key objective of ISS is to verify that these assumptions remain valid through ongoing usage and condition monitoring.
However, where actual operational usage deviates from qualification assumptions, there is a risk that missile life is not managed optimally. Missiles exposed to less severe conditions may be underutilised, while those exposed to more severe operational may accumulate damage more rapidly and consume their CC life faster than predicted.
Solution
The QinetiQ-developed methodology quantifies the relative severity of different types of flying (TOFs) based on key parameters that influence missile life consumption. These encompass both carriage conditions (such as aircraft carriage station, loadout configuration etc.) as well as flight conditions (including mission profile distributions and time allocation across different regions of the flight envelope).
The proposed methodology produces damage potential ratios for each TOF relative to qualification levels. These ratios reflect the rate at which the defined CC life is consumed. This represents an improvement to the conventional approach which treats each TOF as equally damaging. Combined with the flight history of a specific missile, this allows for a more accurate estimation of its consumed CC life which supports improved safety assessments as well as potential extended weapon utilisation, cost and capability benefits.
Session 5A Test and Evaluation
Advanced rocket motor technology demonstrator program
Mr Andrew Hart
Defence Science and Technology Group
Abstract
At Parari 2024, Defence Science & Technology Group and Thales Australia provided insights into the purpose, objectives, technologies, and industry collaboration that had led to the Advanced Rocket Motor Technology Demonstrator (ARMTD) Program being awarded the Defence Innovation, Science, and Technology Award for Excellence in Collaboration.
ARMTD is continuing to: progress Australia's intellectual property and know-how in advanced, militarily-relevant rocket motor design principles and component technologies; developing the specialised scientific, engineering, and industrial practices, and; identifying and exercising candidate supply-chains that could underwrite domestic militarily-relevant solid rocket motor propulsion development and manufacturing capability in support of the National Defence Strategy 2026 and GWEO Enterprise objectives.
At Parari 2026 DSTG and Thales will present on: key program achievements, including a number of 'Australian firsts'; technology, infrastructure and industry advancements; challenges faced; lessons learnt, and; insights gained over the preceding two years as part of the ongoing ARMTD program.
Session 5B Manufacturing
Energetic material qualification testing of new alpha cellulose board gun propellant
Dr Tristan Kilmartin
Defence Science and Technology Group
Abstract
Nitrocellulose, manufactured through the nitration of Alpha Cellulose Board derived from wood pulp and cotton linters, has a wide variety of uses, including printing inks, lacquers, cosmetics, car paints, COVID-19 diagnostic tests, and munitions. In Australia, nitrocellulose is manufactured by Thales Australia at Mulwala and processed into propellants. The propellants used by Defence must meet stringent standards in relation to chemical composition, geometry, and quality to ensure consistent performance, safe operation, and long-term storage stability. All Australian-produced energetic materials, including propellants, are required to undergo Energetic Material Qualification (EMQ) by the Directorate of Ordnance Safety (DOS). Australia's EMQ requirements are provided in Defence Explosive Ordnance Publication (DEOP) 102 and are well aligned with NATO STANAG 4170/AOP-07. Defence Science and Technology Group (DSTG) was tasked with conducting most of the EMQ testing activities.
EMQ comprises a comprehensive series of laboratory-scale physical and chemical tests designed to characterise material properties critical to safety and suitability for service. Safety tests include quantification of stabiliser additives, sensitiveness assessments against friction, impact, electrical spark, and thermal stimuli, and chemical and thermal stability tests. Performance tests include assessment of behaviour upon inflammation, behaviour upon ignition, and characterisation of burn rate, force, and quickness. These tests are conducted on fresh and artificially aged material to ensure that it remains safe and suitable for use throughout the lifetime of the material. Testing is often labour-intensive due to the large number of tests required, and time-consuming due to the requirement to test aged materials.
In 2024, the supplier of the Defence-approved Alpha Cellulose Board advised that production would cease, which necessitated the identification of an alternative cellulose source. This change in cellulose supply has necessitated an Energetic Material Qualification (EMQ) of the gun propellants manufactured using the new cellulose source to ensure continued delivery of safe and suitable products to Defence users. Thales Australia, GWEO Manufacturing, DOS, and DSTG have worked collaboratively to agree on an EMQ test program. DSTG has effectively progressed with this test program.
This presentation will discuss what tests are required for EMQ and why they are relevant; how DSTG conducted the ageing and testing regimes for gun propellant manufactured from new cellulose supplies whilst effectively utilising available resources; and how value-add opportunities were implemented to maximise the benefit to Defence.
Development of a non-toxic cannon propellant formulation for current and future large calibre applications
Dr Daniel Baer
Thales Australia
Abstract
The production facility at Mulwala has a long history in making and supplying large calibre propellants for the Australian Defence Force (ADF) stretching back to when it was first built in 1943. However, since the Mulwala Modernised Facility was built, there has been a lull in the production and development of large calibre propellants, due mainly to changing and uncertain futures in the large calibre landscape.
This has now changed, with renewed interest in large calibre applications worldwide driving the development of propellant formulations designed for modern applications. This body of work has developed a large calibre formulation that suits the specific manufacturing environment at Mulwala and has replaced legacy ingredients that are no longer acceptable in a modern manufacturing environment.
Initial performance indicators demonstrate that the energy and burn rate windows of legacy propellants like M6 can be matched. The program has also shown the ability to bracket the performance of BS-NACO using this formulation system and a program is underway to scale up to low-rate industrial production levels.
All ingredients used are non-toxic and meet the requirements of European REACH legislation. This paper describes the development of this non-toxic formulation, the current work, and the intended future applications being worked towards.
Session 5C Safety and Suitability for Service
The default HERO susceptibility trace: Validity, limitations and practical application in modern EO safety
Mr David Cooling
K39C
Abstract
The HERO (Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance) susceptibility trace contained within NAVSEA OP 3565 Volume 2 has long served as the default bounding tool for assessing RF risks to electrically initiated EO, particularly in the absence of HERO test data. However, its continued validity—both as a conservative envelope and as a practical decision-making tool—requires renewed examination in the context of modern EO technologies and increasingly complex electromagnetic environments.
This presentation critically re-examines what the so-called "default trace" represents: not a device-specific ignition threshold, but a generalized Maximum Allowable Environment (MAE) envelope derived from aggregated tri-service test data, conservative modelling assumptions, and worst-case coupling scenarios. The trace embeds significant safety margins and intentionally collapses complex RF coupling phenomena into a single frequency-dependent field strength threshold. Its strength lies in its simplicity and historically conservative nature; however, this same abstraction obscures key underlying assumptions.
The central question addressed is: when can, and when should, this susceptibility trace be used? Particular focus is given to its application to non-complex EO configurations, such as simple detonators with firing leads, where physical layout (e.g. extended versus twisted pair conductors, or leads wrapped around the detonator body) materially influences RF coupling mechanisms. These seemingly simple systems often exhibit behaviour highly dependent on geometry, resonance, and polarisation, raising questions about whether the default trace remains appropriately bounding or unnecessarily restrictive.
Compounding this issue is the evolution of electro-explosive devices (EEDs). Modern initiators increasingly incorporate low-energy or semiconductor-based technologies, introducing susceptibility mechanisms—such as RF rectification, nonlinear junction effects, and frequency-selective "hot spots"—that are not fully captured by legacy thermal ignition models of bridgewire EEDs that underpin the OP 3565 curves. Consequently, the universality of the default trace as a conservative representation of susceptibility is progressively weakened.
This presentation argues that while the OP 3565 susceptibility trace remains valid as a high-level screening tool and conservative baseline, it should no longer be treated as a universally bounding model. Instead, its use must be context-dependent and informed by the nature of the EO, the configuration of its conductive elements, and the characteristics of the electromagnetic environment. For non-complex EO, pragmatic engineering judgement—supported by an understanding of coupling mechanisms—remains essential.
Ultimately, the presentation advocates for a shift from reliance on generalized curves toward a more data-driven and proportionate approach, integrating device-specific assessment, targeted testing, and measured electromagnetic environmental data (e.g. HERO surveys). Such an approach preserves safety assurance while avoiding unnecessary conservatism where evidence demonstrates lower susceptibility. In an era where strategic competition can rapidly transition to operational conflict, explosive ordnance safety frameworks must remain robust yet adaptable, enabling informed risk decisions that support capability, readiness, and operational tempo. By applying safety measures proportionate to the actual hazard, practitioners can better determine when the default trace is appropriate, when it is insufficient, and how to bridge the gap between legacy guidance, modern EO technologies, and the demands of contemporary operations.
Novel instrumentation technique to derive critical diameter in PBXN-111
Dr Valerian Kuznetsov
Defence Science and Technology Group
Abstract
Critical diameter is an important performance characteristic of a high explosive but depending on the explosive formulation there can be challenges with measurement. An explosive of interest to the GWEO enterprise, PBXN-111, has a large critical diameter, 60-80 mm, which requires a large amount of material to be tested.
In order to avoid the impost of large scale testing, attempts were made to miniaturise the experimental setup. A sample of PBXN-111 of a sub-critical diameter was overdriven with a Composition A-5 or PE-4 booster, and the distance to the detonation failure was measured. This experimental datum was used to calibrate an Ignition and Growth kinetic model used in CTH code, which allowed reconstruction of the critical diameter of the explosive. This approach of combining computational modelling with relatively small scale and simple experiments demonstrated the potential to reduce imposts associated with characterising explosives that exhibit large critical diameters.
Energetic material qualification of Thales Australia produced PBXN-111 (AX-2002)
Dr Caitlyn Neesam
Defence Science and Technology Group
Mr Nicholas Buggy
Thales Australia
Abstract
To support Commonwealth requirements to establish sovereign manufacture of key Defence capabilities under the GWEO enterprise, a variant of the underwater explosive formulation PBXN-111 (designated AX-2002) was developed for qualification by Thales Australia. This work, primarily conducted at the Government owned, Contractor operated facility in Mulwala, NSW, involved scale-up of manufacture of AX-2002 from pilot (5 kg) to production (30 kg) scale. This was undertaken in consultation with the system Prime to ensure acceptance of the variant formulation as main charge explosive fill of the relevant munition. A de-risking approach was used to assess manufacturing process safety and reliability at each stage.
Where possible, raw materials were sourced from existing Australian Industrial Capability, including the energetic RDX from the Mulwala Facility and Aluminium powder from Ecka Granules. Production and testing equipment and hardware were also procured from domestic suppliers.
Once produced, DSTG performed a series of independent conformance and qualification tests of the AX-2002. This test series included sensitiveness, thermal and explosive performance (comprising velocity and pressure detonation, shock sensitivity and critical diameter). While most of the testing involved was considered routine for DSTG, this thermodynamically non-ideal explosive required less common tests, such as Expanded Large Scale Gap Test (ELSGT). To add to the complexity of interpreting these results, the tests were carried out in air, whereas the formulation contains explosive and oxidising components designed for underwater applications. As such, there is a wish to gain representative data of the energetic function in the appropriate environment, in this case, underwater.
Session 6A Regulation and Risk Management
NATO Ammunition Recognition Program (NARP)
Mr Gilles Belley
Department of National Defence, Canada
Abstract
The NATO Ammunition Recognition Program (NARP) is a Conference of National Armaments Directors initiative developed under the NATO Ammunition Safety Group to address a critical interoperability challenge within the Alliance: the absence of a common NATO framework to provide assurance that munitions employed by, or exchanged among, Allied and Partner nations have been certified as safe by a recognized authority. While many nations have adopted NATO ammunition safety standards, differences in national implementation, regulatory structures, oversight mechanisms, and governance models can create uncertainty regarding munition safety in multinational operations.
NARP establishes a structured recognition framework that enables NATO to understand, assess, and accept a nation's ammunition safety policies, procedures, governance structures, and assurance mechanisms across the entire munitions lifecycle. Rather than assessing individual munitions or weapons systems, the program evaluates the effectiveness of national ammunition safety regimes and their alignment with NATO principles and standards governing munition acquisition, introduction into service, risk management, surveillance, regulatory oversight, sustainment, and disposal.
The assessment process is centered on the NATO Ammunition Recognition Question Set, which evaluates eleven key areas, including organizational authorities, safety policies, risk management, hazard classification, training, through-life management, in-service surveillance, storage facilities, regulatory oversight, licensing, and occurrence reporting. Assessment activities are conducted by a NATO Assessment Team and culminate in the issuance of a NATO Assessment Report and, where appropriate, a NATO Recognition Certificate.
By providing commanders with confidence that munitions from participating nations can be safely handled, stored, transported, and employed, NARP enhances interoperability, supports interchangeability, improves operational readiness, and reduces the transfer of unforeseen safety risks during multinational operations. The program also promotes harmonization of NATO standards, encourages continuous improvement through peer review, and strengthens trust and cooperation among Allied and Partner nations. Ultimately, NARP represents a significant step toward a more coherent and internationally harmonized approach to ammunition safety governance across the Alliance.
Enabling proportional safety in conflict through adaptive explosive materiel limits
Mrs Norah Walden
GWEO Systems Division
Abstract
Risk appetite is a critical but often under-examined determinant of how safety is managed across the capability lifecycle. In periods of strategic competition, Defence organisations typically operate with a low tolerance for technical and operational risk, supported by conservative certification processes, extensive flight test activity, and rigidly enforced limitations. These limitations—whether they relate to flight envelopes, release parameters, jettison conditions, or system integration constraints—serve as explicit safety barriers designed to control uncertainty and protect personnel, platforms and munitions during capability development.
However, when competition escalates into conflict, the relationship between risk appetite and safety changes rapidly. Operational urgency can compress decision timelines, increase tolerance for uncertainty, and drive the reassessment of limitations that were previously considered inviolable. The challenge becomes determining which safety margins are essential, which can be safely traded, and how such decisions are justified and governed under pressure.
Drawing on principles from aircraft flight test engineering and Defence project management, this paper examines how risk appetite shapes the interpretation, enforcement and adaptation of technical limitations from peacetime to high-intensity operations. It explores how structured risk-management methods used in flight test—such as hazard analyses, mission-phase-based risk scaling, and tiered approval authorities—can inform proportional explosive ordnance safety decisions during rapid escalation.
By reframing limitations as dynamic controls rather than fixed constraints, this paper proposes a proportional safety model that supports both operational effectiveness and traceable risk acceptance. This approach helps ensure that safety remains not only a regulatory requirement but a strategic advantage when transitioning from competition to conflict.
Session 6B Manufacturing
Environmental impacts of explosive ordnance – Why should we care?
Ms Taryn Collaton
Defence Science and Technology Group
Abstract
Explosive ordnance can have a wide ranging and long lasting impact on the environment. Even without the effects of conflict, significant impacts to the environment can occur throughout the life of explosive ordnance, from manufacture to disposal. This can have serious consequences for human health and ecological receptors. In the United States alone, it is estimated that 15 million acres of land may be contaminated due to unexploded ordnance and other hazardous waste materials, as a result of training, testing, and disposal activities involving military munitions. The clean-up cost of this legacy contamination is estimated to be between US$8-35 billion.
The importance of proactive environmental management of potentially contaminating activities across a wide range of sectors has gained considerable attention over the last 30 years. Blockbuster Hollywood movies such as A Civil Action, Erin Brokovich, and Dark Waters, have all shone a spotlight on the potential adverse impacts of contamination associated with industrial activities. As a result, communities have become better informed and more vocal in demanding transparency and accountability, and these demands have been augmented by a growing body of scientific evidence demonstrating the short and long-term impacts of environmental contamination on human health and ecological receptors. In response, environmental regulation in many countries has progressed to foster a proactive culture focussed on the prevention, early detection and management of contamination. The economic benefits of this approach is becoming increasingly evident when compared with costs to remediate and manage legacy contamination.
The United States and Canada have active research programs in place to investigate environmental impacts associated with energetic materials. In fact, they have been collaborating for the last 25 years to understand the fate and transport of energetic materials at training ranges in response to concerns over increasingly stringent environmental regulation in the context of demilitarisation and the closure of military bases. In Europe, many countries now have active research programs focussed on 'environmentally responsible munitions'. The key focus of each program varies, with some focussed on disposal methods and reducing reliance on open burning and open detonation, and some focussed on manufacturing processes and the reduction of toxic materials. More broadly, there is general agreement that the potential environmental impacts associated with explosive ordnance is best managed at the design stage, through a robust life cycle assessment approach.
This presentation will outline the initial steps Defence Science and Technology Group (DSTG) is taking to develop key research initiatives that are focussed on understanding and reducing environmental impacts associated with the manufacture, use, storage and disposal of energetic materials in an Australian context.
Considerations in support of sovereign perchlorate manufacture in Australia
Mr Benjamin Boyle
Flinders University
Mr Julian Jones
Flinders University
Abstract
The 2026 National Defence Strategy (NDS) and 2026 Integrated Investment Program (IIP) outline Government investment of $26 – $36 billion to achieve a sovereign weapons manufacturing capability and long-range strike capability. Sovereign manufacture of rocket propulsion systems (and their ingredients), including those containing perchlorate, is central to achieving these outcomes. In building this capability, it is essential that potential environmental and health risks due to manufacturing processes are identified and appropriately managed at the outset to reduce risk and sustain ongoing capability.
Perchlorate (ClO4-) has been identified as an emerging contaminant of global concern due to its environmental persistence, high water solubility, and its capacity to disrupt iodine uptake in the thyroid, and a growing body of evidence demonstrates that perchlorate contamination in water and soil arise through point-source defence and industrial-related contamination. Mismanagement of this material has the potential to cause adverse impacts to human health and the environment.
Literature shows that defence-related perchlorate sources have been identified at all stages of the lifecycle; including manufacture, use, and disposal of perchlorate-containing rocket propellants, demilitarisation via open-burning/open detonation of munitions, and legacy use of pyrotechnics, explosives, flares, fuses, and simulators used for onsite military training or warfare. For example, historical use of the M115A2 (ground burst projectile simulator) and the M116A1 (hand grenade simulator) account for approximately 70% of the perchlorate contamination released onsite of U.S. training ranges. Case studies of groundwater contamination plumes at former training, testing, and disposal sites linked to the static firing and open detonation of rocket motors illustrate its persistence in the environment and its ability to migrate through soil and water.
This presentation will summarise the key issues, challenges, and prevention strategies so that Australia can thrive as a sovereign perchlorate manufacturer. Importantly, it will highlight the initial research being undertaken to augment the development of relevant guidelines for environmental monitoring, and provide supporting information for the design, construction, and operation of perchlorate manufacturing sites in Australia.
Session 6C Safety and Suitability for Service
Remote controlled fuzing – two approaches to standard compliant safety and suitability for service
Mr Jakob Breiner
Munitions Safety Information Analysis Center (MSIAC), Belgium
Abstract
Modern munitions such as area denial systems or loitering munitions increasingly depend on remotely controlled Safety, Arming and Functioning (SAF) systems to ensure operational safety. Yet no promulgated NATO standard specifically governs the remote-control aspects.
The dedicated standard (AOP-67) has been in the drafting process for quite some time and even though significant progress was made within the last two years, it is not expected to be promulgated before 2027.
This presentation aims to bridge the gap and provide guidance on how to ensure safety and suitability for service of remote controlled SAF systems via existing standards (such as AOP-4187, AOP-4497, AOP-20, etc.) for initiation systems as well as system safety (such as MIL-STD-882E, IEC-61508, etc.) and establishes best-practice methods.
Keep your distance! Safe separation and no-arm distance for fuzes
Mr Matthew Ferran
Department of Defence
Abstract
A fundamental design safety requirement for fuzing systems is that No-arm Distance must be greater than Safe Separation Distance (SSD). Unfortunately, these concepts are often misunderstood, which has the potential to undermine effective identification and communication of hazards. The result is that users may unknowingly be exposing themselves to elevated levels of risk.
This presentation explains the concepts of No-arm Distance and SSD, and how they may be effectively determined for a given munition system. Consideration is given to the aspects of fuzing system design which influence No-arm Distance; and to the damaging effects of explosive ordnance which influence SSD. Responsibilities for determining No-arm distance and SSD are discussed in terms of the requirements of Defence explosive safety policy.
Symposium Product Brief
Use of RF to Emulate Explosive Effects
Mr Don Williams
Layer 3 Services
Abstract
This paper builds on those delivered to Parari 2005, 2019 and 2022 and confirms the ability to emulate explosive effects, in the real-world environment without causing damage, has been achieved.
Using radio frequency energy, the 'Hazard over Distance' systems emulate the hydrodynamics of blast, the ballistics of fragmentation, the thermal energy of heat and the downwind hazards of CBR. This has only been possible in the last few years due to improvements in RF technology and miniaturised computing capability.
The ability to use RF energy to emulate 'Hazard over Distance' provides the ability to trigger an event and have immediate indication of the effects. This new capability has numerous applications when planning and validating proportional safety. It allows planners and managers to test and confirm systems, engineers to develop and prove their designs and service delivery personnel to test their processes, practices and procedures. Such an emulation capability enables all those responsible for the safe use explosives to 'see' the effects of an explosion.
Two explosive emulation systems have been developed. One uses LEDs to indicate blast and fragmentation effects and is suitable for training of those who use explosives through the life cycle. The other is a highly accurate measuring tool that provides a digital readout of both Peak Incident and Normally Reflected pressures without the need for an explosion. While using different RF technologies, both systems consist of a transmitter into which is entered the type and quantity of explosive (up to 20,000 kg) and receivers which are issued to participants or placed on selected equipment, assets or structures.
The systems also have a role to play in the study and reduction of minor Traumatic Blast Injury (mTBI) as accurate measurements can be used in preparation of explosive use, training and operational rehearsal thereby testing and validating training practices and reducing operator exposure.
The use of RF energy to emulate other forms of physics and thereby indicate 'Hazard over Distance' enables an entire new capability within proportional safety from concept through completion to conflict.
An Innovative Australian Explosive Ordnance Storage System
Mr Don Williams
Layer 3 Services
Abstract
An Australian-owned company (InQuik®) have developed a uniquely Australian FPE solution. This innovative approach takes the best from cast-in-situ and pre-cast construction and eliminates the negatives. The result is a factory fabricated modular, deployable, and quality assured structural system. Many hundreds of these structures have already been deployed throughout Australia, the Pacific Islands and the USA.
The InQuik Accelerated Construction system can create modular protective structures as readily as its current bridge products. It provides blast and fragmentation protection through its innovative design configuration:
• The basic modules comprise a traditional rebar cage structure including diagonal steel reinforcement lacing that can be positioned and integrated together to form the required final dimensional structure.
• The rebar cage is wrapped in a structural steel formwork envelope, making the self-supporting modules that are transported to the job site. The lightweight modules are easy to ship and deploy. On site, they are positioned, linkage bars join the modules together, and the structure is filled with concrete which will cure as a single homogenous mass of reinforced concrete.
• The modules require no external propping or support when being assembled – simply place and pour. On a recent structural pour in central Queensland, the following timeline was reported by the customer:
o Abutments arrive on site: 10:40am
o First abutment positioned: 11:20am
o Second abutment positioned: 12:00pm
o Abutment pour began at 1:30pm. Curing begins.
o Roof panels were installed 2 days later – only took "a few hours".
• The concrete accounts for 90% of the mass of the structure. It is specified as 40 MPa concrete, but different variants are allowed. Rapid curing concrete can be used when time is tight. Autogenous curing will keep the concrete strength increasing over time.
• This unique configuration provides enhanced flexural capacity (under blast loading) whilst also significantly mitigating spall hazards. The system's existing composition makes it suitable to defeat (scenario-specific) blast and fragment loads.
• The system is scalable, such that it can resist even greater design threats, all of which may be fully validated and verified via World's-best practice, in terms of both: (1) modelling & simulation, and (2) full-scale trials, all gathering Objective Quality Evidence (OQE) that demonstrates the structural appropriateness of this proposal's new FPE solution, and in full accord with Defence's Test and Evaluation (T&E) criteria.
The method has been deployed hundreds of times. The lightweight, pre-engineered and certified modular components have been shipped to many remote locations, where entire structures are emplaced within days. The lack of onsite fixing, formwork, or props are key factors that enable these structures to be deployed with:
(1) high-quality steel components,
(2) low mass & volume,
(3) easily and quickly assembled on site (with minimal skilled labour), and
(4) the concrete is cured in-situ.
These FPE structures can be 'ordered to suit', and for different span and height requirements. The system will work for small, medium and large protective structures, with variable span lengths and wall heights for each individual challenge.
Session 7A Risk Modelling
Physics Based Modelling of Earth Covered Magazine (ECM) Breakup and Consequences Using Ammunition and Explosives Consequence Analysis Tool (AECAT)
Mr Neil McCormick
Lloyd's Register Advisory, Canada
Abstract
The Ammunition and Explosives Consequence Analysis Tool (AECAT) was developed to support risk-based management and explosive storage safety analyses for the Canadian Department of National Defence (DND) Director Ammunition and Explosive Regulation (DAER). Built upon the established Rapid City Planner (RCP) computational platform, AECAT provides scenario-based, fast, and physically accurate predictions of blast, fragmentation, and debris hazards arising from explosive events in ammunition storage environments.
AECAT integrates a virtual globe interface with automated geospatial data fusion to evaluate explosive storage scenarios in a geolocated frame of reference. The tool combines first-principles computational fluid dynamics (CFD)-based blast modelling with physics-based models for primary fragmentation and storage structure breakup. Together, these capabilities enable consequence assessments that account for natural terrain, surrounding barricades and infrastructure, and detailed munition storage configurations, while remaining practical for use on standard desktop computing hardware. AECAT has been extensively validated for blast and primary fragmentation, including validation for explosive events involving light-confinement magazine structures. Modelling of heavily confined earth covered magazine (ECM) response and breakup is a recent enhancement.
This paper presents recent AECAT developments supporting earth-covered magazine (ECM) consequence analysis, including automated ECM geometry generation, terrain-integrated scenario definition, and physics-based prediction of structural breakup, debris generation, and soil ejecta hazards. Two complementary ECM debris methodologies are described: a detailed continuum breakup approach that directly resolves explosive loading, structural failure, and debris formation, and a fast-engineering approach based on generalized Gurney theory and fragmentation models. Application to a representative ECM storage scenario demonstrates the influence of confinement, venting, magazine orientation, and terrain on blast and debris consequences, while comparisons between the detailed and engineering approaches show generally consistent hazard predictions with substantially different computational requirements. Results are analysed alongside conventional quantity-distance (QD) methodologies to illustrate the value of site-specific, physics-based consequence analysis for modern explosive safety assessments.
Practical application of the ammunition and explosives consequence analysis tool (AECAT)
Mr Christopher Heron
Canadian Department of National Defence
Abstract
Ammunition and explosives (A&E) safety programs throughout NATO have traditionally relied upon Quantity-Distance (QD) standards to protect personnel, infrastructure, and operational capability from the consequences of accidental explosions. While these standards provide a robust and widely accepted framework for explosives safety, military operations frequently occur in environments where strict compliance with prescribed QD criteria is impractical or impossible. Expeditionary deployments, seaport operations, ammunition trans-shipment nodes, tactical artillery positions, and legacy infrastructure often require commanders and safety authorities to balance operational necessity against safety requirements.
The Ammunition and Explosives Consequence Analysis Tool (AECAT) was developed to support risk informed decision-making in circumstances where traditional compliance-based approaches are unworkable. Leveraging geographic information systems (GIS), explosive effects modelling, fragmentation analysis, population exposure assessment, and infrastructure vulnerability evaluation, AECAT provides a comprehensive assessment of the potential consequences associated with accidental explosive events. Rather than focusing solely on separation distances, the tool evaluates the likely effects of an explosion on personnel, facilities, critical infrastructure, and surrounding communities, enabling decision makers to better understand and manage residual risk.
This paper describes the development, analytical framework, and operational applications of AECAT. The methodology employed by the tool is discussed, including blast overpressure prediction, fragmentation hazard assessment, debris modelling, and consequence visualization. Several representative case studies are presented, including deployed ammunition storage facilities, earth-covered magazine validation trials, seaport ammunition trans-shipment operations, and artillery ammunition concentration assessments. These examples demonstrate how consequence-based analysis can support operational planning, infrastructure development, risk acceptance processes, and explosives safety management.
The paper concludes that AECAT provides a practical capability for bridging the gap between prescriptive explosives safety requirements and operational realities. By quantifying potential consequences and presenting them in an accessible format, the tool enhances the ability of commanders, engineers, and explosives safety specialists to make informed decisions while maintaining acceptable levels of risk.
Warships in Harbour: Consequence advice for decision makers
Dr Michael Netherton
Karagozian & Case
Abstract
The Royal Australian Navy, in conjunction with other agencies, quantified some of the unique consequences associated with Warships in Harbour, and for a variety of platforms berthed at a variety of locations.
• In short: The work considers probable blast loads & fragmentation impact, in order to predict consequences to buildings and people to areas within and surrounding major Port Facilities.
• We discuss K&C's significant cityscape CFD modeling and simulation + fragment characterization effort used within this work, as well as showcasing the 'leading-edge' methods as-developed in our provision of risk-based advice for decision makers and regulators.
The Field Deployable Siting and Licensing Tool
Mr Rhys Centin
Thornton Tomasetti Australia, GWEO
Abstract
Since 2023, the Directorate Ordnance Safety (DOS) in conjunction with other key Explosive Ordnance (EO) capability stakeholders, have been engaging with Thornton Tomasetti (TT) to provide a bespoke software solution, which enables the rapid siting and licensing of EO storage facilities – the Field Deployable Siting and Licensing Tool (FDESLT).
Partially inspired by SAFER (developed in the US), the FDESLT begun its development due to the growing need for Commonwealth employees working in the EO safety sector to be able to rapidly develop or modify site plans, EO licenses and in general consider EO related risk in a more dynamic format than what is currently available. One of the key drivers for the FDESLT's creation as opposed to the employment of an existing product, is to provide a bespoke solution to the Department of Defence that can be managed and developed in conjunction with the ever-evolving requirements for EO safety in Australia. There have been three major development milestones in the FDESLT's evolution since 2023, this paper will seek to detail the development of the FDESLT, describing the past roadmap which has gotten the tool to its current state in 2026, and discuss the goals for the development of the tool into the future – overall building on the presentation and update provided at Parari in 2024.
The future pathway for development of the software tool will seek to lean on the needs and requirements of the Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance (GWEO) enterprise. As the Commonwealth seeks to expand its strategic base for EO manufacture under the 2026 National Defence Plan, the FDESLT will play a crucial role in providing GWEO with the correct tool to streamline assessment of greenfield sites for EO siting and licensing, as well as rapidly screen brownfield sites for the appropriateness of re-purposing or developing additional infrastructure to meet these strategic goals. In addition to GWEO's strategic goals at home, the FDESLT still requires development with the strategic goals of being 'Field Deployable' and will continue its development with the ethos to enhance the rapid EO siting functions carried out by deployed personnel in the field.
Session 7B Regulation / Storage and Transport / Test and Evaluation
Appropriate Prioritisation of High Consequence Hazards
CAPT Paul Yow, RAN
Director, Ordnance Safety – Department of Defence
Abstract
Guidance on how to manage the very high consequence – low likelihood Risks/hazards and methods to appropriately allocate resources to assess, approve, and proactively manage these hazards rather than just reactively dealing with accidents and incidents of far lower consequence.
From Data to Decision: Designing for Evidence Sufficiency in Test and Evaluation
Mr Adam Leer
Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance Group
Abstract
Engineering decisions rely on test and inspection evidence to establish confidence in safety and performance. However, there is no clear or defensible way to determine when that evidence is sufficient. As a result, confidence and residual risk are often inferred rather than demonstrated, particularly as conditions shift from competition to conflict.
This paper addresses this fundamental gap by redefining how evidence is structured and assessed. It presents Objective Quality Evidence (OQE) as a disciplined framework for defining evidence, where sufficiency is determined not by volume, but by independence, relevance, and coverage.
Effective Degrees of Freedom is proposed as a practical means of estimating independent informational content, enabling engineers to distinguish between apparent evidence volume and actual decision-relevant information.
The paper demonstrates how current test and inspection practices can unintentionally reduce evidence independence through factors such as shared assumptions, instrumentation coupling, procedural reuse, and data conditioning. These effects limit information gain, obscure sufficiency, and create uncertainty in decision support.
A structured approach is proposed to design test and inspection activities around information gain, ensuring that evidence is both independent and decision-relevant. This enables a clearer link between recorded activity and engineering judgement, providing a defensible basis for determining when enough evidence has been obtained. The result is a practical pathway to achieving proportional safety across environments ranging from competition to conflict.
Safe to Arm, Ready to Fight: Evolving Fuze Systems for Modern Defence
Mr Benjamin Campion
JUNGHANS Microtec GmbH - Germany
Abstract
JUNGHANS Defence is a leading international supplier of advanced fuze and safety systems for artillery, mortar, naval, missile and loitering ammunition. Headquartered in Germany with subsidiary in France, the company combines experience with innovative technologies to provide safe, reliable and high-performance solutions for armed forces worldwide since 1861.
JUNGHANS Defence is represented by NIOA Australia offering complete solutions for the Commonwealth's LAND 17-1C.2 Future Artillery Ammunition program delivering a highly compliant and capable suites of modern 155mm projectile systems. The longstanding partnership between NIOA and JUNGHANS extends to delivery of proximity fuzed 5-inch munitions for the Royal Australian Navy's Counter Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) munitions extending into collaboration on Advanced Strategic Capabilities Accelerator (ASCA) Mission Syracuse for development of Electronic Safe Arm & Functioning (ESAF) enabled proximity payloads.
The increasing complexity of modern military operations, combined with the rapid evolution of ammunition technologies, has elevated the importance of robust fuze safety requirements throughout the entire life cycle of explosive ordnance. Fuzes represent the critical interface between ammunition safety and operational effectiveness, requiring a careful balance between reliability, survivability, and protection against unintended initiation.
This paper examines current safety requirements for conventional and advanced fuze systems, focusing on design principles, qualification methodologies, and compliance with international safety standards. Particular attention is given to the implementation of Independent Safety Features, environmental sensing technologies, and electronic safety architectures that mitigate risks during manufacture, transportation, storage, handling, and operational deployment.
The presentation further discusses emerging challenges associated with increasingly networked and electronically controlled munitions, including cyber resilience, electromagnetic compatibility, and the integration of smart fuze technologies. Lessons learned from recent qualification programs and international defence projects are used to illustrate practical approaches for achieving both regulatory compliance and operational readiness.
The paper concludes by highlighting how to support Defence organisations and industry partners in maintaining high safety standards while enabling the rapid fielding of next-generation munitions. The findings contribute to the broader discussion on how explosive ordnance safety can adapt effectively to evolving strategic and operational environments.
From Competition to Conflict: Designing Explosive Ordnance Infrastructure for Proportional Risk
Mr Billy Durrant
BG&E Australia
Abstract
How do explosive safety requirements scale as nations transition from strategic competition to credible conflict posture, where operational risk increases, mission urgency compresses timelines and production capability accelerates?
Explosive safety frameworks such as NATO's AASTP 5 and Defence engineering policies including eDEOP were developed within a peacetime paradigm characterised by stable stockpile, predictable hazard divisions and incremental infrastructure growth. Their foundational purpose, preventing catastrophic propagation and protecting life and capability, remains unchanged. However, the transition from competition to conflict reshape the operational and delivery context in which these frameworks are applied.
Sovereign munitions production uplift, distributed storage models and accelerated construction programs introduce new pressures: compressed delivery schedules, material supply variability, construction-stage exposure and increased throughput. Permanent works are designed for blast resilience; temporary works are typically designed for construction efficiency and short-term stability. Under accelerated delivery conditions, the interaction between the two becomes a safety consideration in its own right. Formwork systems, tie arrangements, sequencing assumptions and early-age material performance influence the structural integrity and confinement behaviour of explosive ordnance facilities long before they reach their designed blast-resistant state. Under surge conditions, incomplete confinement, curing variability and stage construction can extend periods of heightened vulnerability. If explosive safety doctrine considers only the completed structure, proportionality may be misjudged, either underestimating construction-phase risk or overcompensating through excessive conservatism in permanent works. If explosive safety is assessed only at the completed state, proportionality may be distorted, either underestimating construction-phase risk or compensating through unnecessary conservatism in permanent works.
This paper argues that scaling safety in a transition from competition to conflict cannot be achieved solely through increased separation distances or additional structural hardening. When delivery timelines compress, safety risk is redistributed across the project lifecycle. This paper argues that scaling safety requires a whole-of-lifecycle approach integrating permanent works, temporary works, material behaviour and construction sequencing as interdependent safety variables. Early-age concrete performance, reinforcement detailing, formwork tie systems, staged confinement and material substitutions under supply stress directly influence both interim vulnerability and ultimate blast resilience. Under surge conditions, proportional safety may be distorted if doctrine considers only completed structure, overlooking construction phase exposure or compensation through excessive conservatism in permanent design.
By examining how safety requirements interact with mission urgency, production uplift and accelerated infrastructure delivery, this paper proposes a risk-informed interpretation of proportionality that accounts for safety as a temporal condition. It argues that explosive safety must therefore be considered as a temporal systems discipline, not solely a static compliance outcome. In doing so, it reframes explosive safety as a dynamic, system-based discipline requiring adaptation as the strategic environment shifts from competition toward conflict.
Session 7C Test and Evaluation / S3
Energetics Material Models for Air Domain GWEO
Mr Damion Hadcroft
QinetiQ Australia
Mr Jason Anglberger
Defence Science and Technology Group
Abstract
Understanding energetic material failure conditions is an important part of managing Safety and Suitability for Service. When it comes to mechanical loads and the associated strain responses, determining the extent to which usage conditions influence the likelihood of material failure can be difficult to predict for a number of reasons, including material response non-linearities, strain-rate dependent material properties, and temperature dependent properties.
Computer models and simulations can help in understanding the complex loading environments that present a likelihood for energetic material failure and historically numerical modelling has often been employed in energetic material studies. However, computer simulations are intrinsically limited by the material property data that underpins the mechanical response prediction. Research efforts are limited by the quantity of data required to create representative material 'rheological' models, which will allow computer simulations of loading environments that are otherwise difficult or impossible to understand.
This technical brief discusses Australian developments in materials science, laboratory testing, and rheological modelling aimed at improving material rheological models for energetic material simulations.
In December 2025, AEOSPO, DSTG and QinetiQ Australia initiated a collaborative effort to attempt development of an advanced material rheological model with the aim of more accurately describing material behaviour under a range of different stimuli. This involved a battery of laboratory tests performed by DSTG, and the subsequent materials response analysis and modelling undertaken by QinetiQ Australia.
This technical brief commences with a review of the material complexities that lie behind this branch of work including material non-linearities; strain-rate dependence; temperature dependence and challenging thermal response properties. From there we will discuss the materials testing that has been performed by DSTG and thereafter, QinetiQ's work in data analysis for rheological model development. The presentation will conclude with an example of simulation results to illustrate the depth of information available in coupled thermomechanical modelling using more complex rheological material models.
Proportional Safety outcomes improved by the Generic Guided Weapon Architecture (GGWA)
Mr Luke Serfas
Australian Missile Corporation
Dr Daniel Clayton
Australian Missile Corporation
Dr Robert Porter
Defence Science and Technology Group
Abstract
The effective use of Government Reference Architectures (GRAs) in Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) is a recognised means of improving the efficiency of system acquisition [1]. The Authors propose that these efficiency gains are also applicable when GRAs are used to develop, promulgate, and certify compliance for systems safety – including when Proportional Safety is the approach.
Incorporating safety in design through use of GRAs affords economies of scale where safety measures can be included through doing the upfront engineering in times of peace. When considering the adjustments in Proportional Safety risk tolerance against the need for rapid capability deployment as the probability of conflict increases; the benefit of capturing knowledge during peace-time for use in fast-paced development becomes clear.
The Guided Weapon Development Network (GWDN) is tasked with:
• Capturing, storing, and disseminating knowledge to de-risk and accelerate GW system and sub-system development;
• Promoting and enabling the early involvement of industry in meeting ADF GW needs; and
• Promoting and enabling a common approach to GW development through engaging and supporting relevant programs.
In alignment with this tasking, GWDN have developed the Generic Guided Weapons Architecture (GGWA). The purpose of the GGWA is to provide:
• A government-owned, open, modular architecture which shapes the allocation of functions to subsystems and defines the interfaces between those subsystems; and
• A standardised template for specifying, designing and integrating subsystems into an All-Up Round (AUR).
The GGWA is intended to be used as the backbone of a framework which integrates the design, safety, and interface standards/requirements of Australian-developed prototype GW systems and sub-systems. The patterns used to specify and develop a system when using the GGWA lend themselves to reuse in the determination and definition of those same standards and requirements.
The Authors propose that the use of this framework can result in faster system development while still meeting proportional system safety requirements in line with proportional-, probabilistic- and quantitative-risk assessments.
The GGWA is intended to be regularly updated to capture learnings from GW system and sub-system development programs – ensuring the value and ease of use increases over time – which is incidentally beneficial to implementing Proportional Safety, and the decision-making involved in changing the risk-appetite to conform with an evolving geopolitical landscape.
EMRNet: Advancing Australia's energetic materials capability for future sovereign GWEO challenges
Prof Nish Hameed
Defence Science and Technology Group
Prof Martin Johnston
Flinders University
Prof Adrian Pudsey
RMIT University
Abstract
Energetic materials are foundational to Australia's future guided weapons and explosive ordnance capability, underpinning propulsion, effects, safety, advanced manufacturing, sustainment, degradation and disposal. Developing sovereign depth in energetic materials is essential to enhance decision-making, mitigate supply chain risks, and develop future Defence capability options—all of which are central to deterrence, preparedness, and operational advantage. This requires a national capability that can shape Defence priorities, grow skilled talent, and maintain awareness of emerging technologies.
The Australian Energetic Materials Research Network (EMRNet) has been established as a Defence-led national mechanism to coordinate and deliver foundational innovation, science and technology (IS&T) outcomes in energetic materials. EMRNet connects Defence, academia and industry to align research, education and training with Defence and GWEO priorities, while building the skilled workforce and knowledge base required for future sovereign capability.
This presentation will introduce EMRNet's strategic context, vision and objectives: to coordinate, mobilise and sustain Australia's energetic materials IS&T ecosystem. EMRNet aims to establish a foundational R&D ecosystem, develop education and training pathways, strengthen strategic collaboration, invest in expertise and infrastructure, promote STEM outreach, and build enduring capability that supports resilience, autonomy and long-term sustainability.
The presentation will further outline EMRNet's four research themes: Design and Modelling; Materials and Synthesis; Advanced Manufacturing, Testing and Evaluation; and Degradation and Disposal. These themes provide an integrated framework spanning predictive modelling, materials design, synthesis, processing, characterisation, manufacturing, performance evaluation, lifecycle resilience and disposal pathways.
Defence Science and technology Group provides Defence-led Strategic leadership, IS&T stewardship and Defence aligned priorities. EMRNet's Strategic Partners, RMIT University and Flinders University lead the research themes and deliver IS&T outcomes while collaborating with partners across the broader ecosystem to build the foundational knowledge base, workforce capability and community of practice in energetic materials.
Together, EMRNet partnership is building a nationally coordinated ecosystem to translate foundational science and technology into future energetic materials capability for Australia's sovereign GWEO challenges.
A Low Cost Hybrid Electronic Nose for the Detection and Classification of Explosive Vapours
Dr Adrian Garrido Sanchis
University of New South Wales
Abstract
The detection of explosives in operational environments remains a significant safety challenge due to the low vapour pressures of many military and improvised explosives, the need for rapid field assessment, and the limitations of laboratory-based analytical techniques. This study investigates the performance of a low-cost hybrid electronic nose (e-nose) designed to support rapid EO screening through the detection and classification of explosive vapour signatures. The system integrates a heterogeneous array of commercially available metal-oxide semiconductor (MOS), electrochemical, optical, and MEMS gas sensors within a closed-loop sampling chamber. Thermal agitation at 50°C was used to enhance vapour release from milligram-scale samples representing major explosive classes, including nitramines, nitrate esters, organic peroxides, primary explosives, and oxidiser salts.
Ten energetic materials were evaluated, including RDX, ETN, nitroglycerin, TATP, HMTD, MEKP, lead azide, mercury fulminate, urea nitrate, and R-salt. Sensor outputs were collected at one-second intervals and analysed using both univariate statistical methods and multivariate pattern-recognition techniques. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was employed to assess the discriminatory capability of the sensor array and identify the most informative sensing modalities.
Results demonstrated that MOS-based sensors provided strong responses to volatile organic compounds and reducing gases, enabling effective discrimination of peroxide explosives and oxidiser salts. Electrochemical sensors provided complementary chemical specificity, particularly for nitrogen-containing and oxidising species. Distinct multi-sensor signatures were observed for TATP, MEKP, R-salt, and urea nitrate, while lower-volatility materials such as RDX and ETN exhibited responses closer to background conditions. PCA analysis showed that the first two principal components accounted for 61.74% of total variance and enabled clear clustering of explosive classes according to their characteristic vapour and decomposition-product profiles.
The preliminary findings demonstrate that meaningful discrimination of explosive materials can be achieved using low-cost, commercially available sensors when deployed within a multisensor fusion and pattern-recognition framework. Future work will support the development of portable EO detection systems capable of enhancing operational safety, reducing personnel exposure during suspicious-item assessment, and providing a scalable screening capability for Defence, law-enforcement, and security applications.
In the context of Proportional Safety – From Competition to Conflict, the proposed e-nose approach offers a practical means of increasing situational awareness and explosive hazard detection without imposing excessive cost, logistical burden, or operator training requirements.
Session 8A Risk Modelling
Characterising blast induced injury: State-of-the-art experiments and predictive modelling and simulation
Mr Asher Gehl
Karagozian & Case
Abstract
EO Regulators and Safety Supervisors deal with risk, of which, a vital component is an understanding of the consequences to the human body, given shock and impact loads.
• This presentation showcases 'State of the Art' Best Practice with respect to modelling & simulation of blast effects and risk mitigation techniques.
• We discuss our experiments, which informs K&C's newly derived modelling tools, such that we deliver evidence-based risk-advice to decision makers, all with a view to keep our warfighters safer - both in training and combat.
Maintaining compliance with Defence criteria and safety standards as EO operations expand beyond the Commonwealth Property Boundary
Ms Lizzy Dobson
ACOR Consultants
Abstract
This presentation will explore how Defence criteria and safety standards evolve from competition environments to high-intensity conflict, particularly in relation to maintaining compliance as EO operations expand beyond the Commonwealth property in an effort to enhance capability. To facilitate discussion of proportionality from competition to conflict, two case studies will be presented.
The first case study discusses some of the key challenges encountered during a recent GWEO study that investigated options for ammunitioning and de-ammunitioning Royal Australian Navy vessels at commercial ports in Australia. A real-life example will be presented to highlight some of the challenges associated with management of safeguarding arcs and quantity distances due to limited information on nearby infrastructure, building occupancy, dangerous goods storage, and security protocols.
The second case study presents research from a technical paper on deployable traverse designs used elsewhere in the world that could be adopted in Australia to provide proportionality during conflict. Barrier designs such as filled containers, shipping containers, dividing walls, anti-frag tanks, and ballistic foam will be discussed along with their potential applications and limitations.
Explosive Ordnance Storage in Constrained Sites - Challenges and Responses
Ms Julie Green
GHD Pty Ltd
Abstract
Explosive Ordnance (EO) storage on Defence land faces increasing constraints due to limited land availability, urban encroachment, and the demands of larger weapon systems. Addressing these challenges requires adherence to strict safety standards while employing innovative planning and design strategies. eDEOP101, which has been developed and standardised over decades, provides the primary planning framework for EO storage by setting stringent safety requirements through quantity distances. These Quantity Distances (QD) isolate potential explosion sites from other storage areas, base boundaries, inhabited buildings, and public areas.
Urban encroachment now tests past siting decisions and limits expansion options on existing bases. Designers use protective structures, including Earth-Covered Buildings (ECBs), blast-resistant construction, and barricades, to address these siting risks by containing explosions and reduce required QD separations. ECBs accommodate ordnance storage within a compact site by using ECB blast containment and earth traverses to satisfy eDEOP101 separation distances. However, these construction methods are expensive and time-consuming to deliver. These complex buildings are not suitable for every site, particularly where remoteness, limited local trade availability, maintenance demands, or cost constraints affect feasibility. End User Monitoring requirements can also impose additional design constraints.
Designers need to understand the implied risk in current EO policy that affect facility layout to accommodate storage types, operational movement, infrastructure, and security requirements. Explosive Storage Facility (ESF) design is a multidisciplinary activity involving not only EO planners but also architects, structural engineers, utility engineers, civil and geotechnical engineers, and cost planners. Compliance and safety assurance are critical on constrained EO storage sites – not just within Australian EO storage policy, but also when working in a Coalition environment.
Project teams may apply risk-informed optioneering supported by quantitative risk assessments where a site cannot achieve standard QDs. One method to do this (computer modelling) is relatively new and needs an underlying agreement on methodology. The strengths and weakness of any CFD and FEA models, as well as the methods used in Qualitative Risk Assessments, must be understood by the Designer, user, licensing authorities and EO policy holders. At present it is not a replacement for QD tables.
In summary, constrained-site EO storage requires careful application of eDEOP101's safety principles, supported by smart planning and design. By managing encroachment and maintaining safety buffers through land-use planning, adopting robust storage solutions such as ECBs and blast-rated structures, and applying rigorous safety classification and licensing controls, Defence can deliver new EO storage facilities in space-limited settings. Qualitative Risk Management is possible, but this is an evolving area where more work is required. This presentation demonstrates how Defence can meet the increased demand for munitions storage through a holistic approach without compromising safety or regulatory compliance.
Session 8B Safety and Suitability for Service
From R&D to ADF Capability: Proportional Safety and Evidence Based Assurance for Weapon Certification
Dr Michael Sharp
Defence Science and Technology Group
Abstract
As Australia accelerates its Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance (GWEO) enterprise, initial R&D efforts have successfully delivered foundational technologies, including domestic rocket motors, warheads, and fuzes. However, integrating these subsystems into operational Australian Defence Force (ADF) capability reveals a significant gap in experience: the application of weapons safety design standards and Safety and Suitability for Service (S3) requirements. Decades of relying on foreign military sales have left gaps in the practical expertise required to build a weapon certification body of knowledge from scratch.
This paper examines the critical need to integrate S3 and Test and Evaluation (T&E) evidence into the earliest stages of capability development. Aligning with the theme From Crisis to Conflict, accelerating delivery under strategic urgency does not mean disregarding safety standards. Instead, a risk-based, proportional safety framework is required to ensure rapid innovation does not introduce unacceptable risks that degrade operational effectiveness. The paper draws on current examples and explores how strategic urgency may impact future development.
Electro-explosive Hazards in the ADF: Addressing the Quiet Threat of Organisational Memory Loss
Mr David Cooling
GWEO Systems Division
Abstract
Electro‑explosive Devices (EEDs) underpin modern Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance (GWEO) capability within the Australian Defence Force (ADF), yet their susceptibility to unintended initiation in complex Electromagnetic Environments (EMEs) presents a persistent and largely invisible hazard. Electro‑Explosive Hazards (EEH), driven by both natural and man‑made electromagnetic stimuli, are difficult to detect, and potentially vulnerable to neglect within broader safety discourse.
This presentation argues that the ADF is at a critical inflection point, where advancing technology is outpacing the institutional mechanisms required to sustain EEH knowledge. A key contributor is organisational memory loss—the gradual erosion of technical understanding resulting from workforce turnover, restructuring, and an over‑reliance on informal, experience-based knowledge transfer. In the absence of structured and enduring knowledge systems, critical insights into EEH mechanisms, controls, and historical lessons risk being diluted or lost entirely.
Compounding this issue has been the lack of a formalised competency framework that explicitly integrates EEH within GWEO Engineering and Technical (E&T) training pathways. Current reliance on ad hoc, on‑the‑job learning limits consistency, traceability, and depth of understanding, particularly for a hazard characterised by low-frequency but high-consequence failure modes. While EEH incidents are rare, their potential consequences—including loss of life, platform damage, and mission degradation—are disproportionate and strategically significant.
The presentation will examine how the convergence of low hazard visibility and insufficient formal education, creates systemic vulnerability within the ADF. It will highlight the risks of treating EEH as a niche or legacy concern, rather than a contemporary systems engineering and safety imperative.
To address these challenges, the presentation focuses on a planned, structured approach to rebuilding and sustaining EEH competency, including:
-Development of targeted training programs and formal integration of EEH into GWEO competency frameworks;
-Improved knowledge capture and transfer mechanisms to preserve institutional expertise.
-Promotion of a culture of continuous learning and evidence-based safety assurance.
Ultimately, this presentation aims to reframe EEH from a "quiet threat" to a visible and managed risk, and to catalyse a broader conversation across Defence, industry, and academia. By strengthening organisational memory and embedding EEH within enduring competency systems, the ADF can better assure the Safety and Suitability for Service of its explosive ordnance capabilities in an increasingly complex electromagnetic battlespace.
Session 8C S3 / Test and Evaluation
Hidden Risks in Sovereign Munitions Manufacturing - Applying AS IEC 62443 to Ensure Production Readiness from Competition to Conflict
Mr Alfonso Sanzo
GPA Engineering
Abstract
As strategic competition increasingly shapes Australia's security environment, a critical question emerges for sovereign guided weapons and explosive ordnance capability: can Defence be confident that the automated manufacturing, storage and logistics systems it will rely upon during conflict have not already been compromised?
Modern Explosive Ordnance (EO) lifecycles, spanning sovereign guided weapons manufacturing, automated storage depots, and digital inventory tracking depend on interconnected Operational Technology (OT) and Industrial Automation and Control Systems (IACS). Many of these systems are sourced through complex global supply chains, creating the potential for vulnerabilities to be introduced long before facilities enter operation.
While traditional IT frameworks focus on data confidentiality, they often fail to directly address the safety-critical, deterministic demands of automated manufacturing and logistics systems. In a conflict environment, a cyber breach of an OT system controlling chemical mixing, temperature logging, or automated crane handling does not just risk a data leak; it risks a catastrophic physical event, rendering "cybersecurity" a core element of kinetic explosive safety. Alternatively, any interruption of the munitions supply chain during an operational conflict state can severely impact combat effectiveness.
This technical brief introduces the pragmatic application of Australia's newly adopted national standard, AS IEC 62443, to ensure proportional munitions safety across the peace-to-conflict continuum. The presentation details how the standard's risk-based "Zones and Conduits" methodology (62443-3-2) can segment highly critical ordnance control networks from standard military base infrastructure. Furthermore, it explores the standard's Security Levels (SL), demonstrating how defence asset owners can proportionally scale system capabilities from SL-2 (during peacetime strategic competition) to SL-3 or SL-4 (to withstand targeted nation-state cyber warfare during active conflict), helping ensure both system safety and continuity of munitions production when operational demand is greatest.
Finally, the brief addresses the crucial requirement of supply chain integrity. By enforcing the secure-by-design component requirements of 62443-4-2 during Defence procurement, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) can compel domestic and international commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) vendors to deliver hardened, resilient systems to the EO enterprise. This becomes increasingly important as Australia establishes new sovereign manufacturing capability and introduces industrial equipment that may remain in service for decades.
Attendees will gain actionable insights into conducting automated processes OT risk assessments, aligning industrial cybersecurity with explosive safety regulations, and leveraging AS IEC 62443 to achieve true mission assurance when transitioning from competition to conflict.
NIOA Benalla Industrialisation: Environmental Test Facility Capability
Mr Sam Brennan
NIOA Australia
Abstract
NIOA operates within its tenancy at the Commonwealth Government Owned, Contractor Operated (GOCO) munitions manufacturing facility in Benalla, Victoria, Australia. From 2017, NIOA operated at Benalla under a sublease arrangement. In 2020, this transitioned from a sublease, to NIOA being tenants in their own right. Since 2020, under a 10-year tenancy agreement (with extension options), NIOA has enhanced this facility which spans primary explosives, medium calibre munitions, large calibre munitions, and pyrotechnics. Alongside advanced manufacturing capabilities, NIOA manages multiple storage magazines for work-in-progress and finished goods. Located in North-East Victoria, Benalla is pivotal in employing local talent in manufacturing, engineering, and support roles, poised to significantly contribute to the Australian munitions market and the regional economy.
In late 2025, NIOA was contracted to update the fuse testing capability at Benalla. The test equipment included but not limited to the following:
a. Conditioning cabinets;
b. Jumble machine;
c. Jolt machine;
d. Vibration table; and
e. associated IT, video and communication equipment.
This briefing will identify the challenges in determining the appropriate standard and correct tests and testing apparatuses which are appropriate for subject fuse. This briefing will also discuss the role of an uplifted ETF capability in supporting proportional safety by enabling the conduct of environmental testing aligned to the applicable Manufacture to Target or Disposal Sequence (MTDS).
Lightning as an Electro-Explosive Hazard in an Army context
MAJ Matthew Reid
Land Explosive Ordnance Systems Program Office, GWEO
Abstract
Lightning represents a persistent electro-explosive hazard (EEH) within the Australian Army operating environment due to its potential to directly and indirectly initiate Electro-Explosive Devices (EEDs). This can result in potentially catastrophic consequences for personnel, platforms, and mission outcomes.
This presentation emphasises lightning as an electro-explosive hazard, highlighting the mechanisms through which lightning interacts with EO systems. These include direct current injection from strikes, electromagnetic coupling into firing circuits, resistive and arc heating, and ground potential rise effects. Collectively, these mechanisms demonstrate that both direct and indirect lightning interactions can unintentionally initiate ordnance, even when the lightning is a considerable distance away from the ordnance. The presentation also addresses a less-recognised outcome — degradation of EEDs without outward indication of damage. Together these mechanisms show that ordnance can be initiated or compromised without a strike on the platform itself.
A key focus is the challenge of managing lightning as a low-probability, high-consequence risk. While lightning events are spatially and temporally infrequent, their consequences demand a consequence-driven risk management approach. The presentation explores how prediction and detection tools—such as lightning detection systems and weather radar—enable proactive mitigations, including operational stand-downs, establishment of safe states, and enforcement of exclusion zones.
The concept of proportional safety is introduced to address how lightning EEH controls must adapt across the operational spectrum—from controlled training environments to high-risk combat operations. While conservative, risk-averse measures dominate peacetime activities, operational and conflict contexts require informed acceptance of elevated risk, supported by engineering controls and increased reliance on technical judgment.
Ultimately, the presentation emphasises that lightning-related EEH risk is manageable but demands a disciplined and technically informed approach. By enhancing awareness of the risk, improving use of situational awareness tools for better informed decision making, and accepting that appropriate risk controls depend on the operational environment, the Army can better safeguard personnel and capability against this unpredictable yet critical hazard.









