

### Safety and Suitability Assurance of Sovereign Loitering Munitions Deployed from Existing UAS

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# Agenda

- Introduction
- Concept Overview
- Types of Regulatory Challenges
- EO Safety Considerations
- System Safety Considerations
- Airworthiness Considerations
- Summary

### Introduction



#### **Background & Context**

- Ukraine-Russia and Middle Eastern theatres feature extensive use of UAS's.
- Air dropped munition UAS boast greater features than conventional guided weapons and loitering munitions.
- Promotes an array of benefits including EO integration and logistics and mission customisability.
- Smaller air dropped munitions are becoming increasingly favourable over larger munitions and kamikaze drones.

#### Objectives

Further investigate and explore regulatory, safety and systems assurance considerations surrounding the integration of air dropped munition on pre-existing UAS.

## LM Concept Overview

#### Air Launched Loitering Munition

- Released from Small UAS carriage platform
- Based on COTS UAS technologies Low cost
- LM mass < 2 kg
- Integrates as a modular retrofit UAS payload module < 15 kg
- Laser or INS/GPS guided with warhead
- Sovereign capability


#### Carriage sUAS


- Existing platform
- Range 50 to 100 km
- UAS onboard ISR sensors used for targeting and designation



### LM Concept Overview

#### Representative UAS Integration





#### **Operational View**

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### Types of Regulatory Challenges

### EO Safety & Suitability

 Ensure EO payload is compatible with the UAS/external interfaces, meets performance requirements while maintaining user safety

#### Systems Safety & Assurance Impacts

Develop a robust System Safety approach that accounts for EO-specific hazards and regulatory requirements

#### Airworthiness Considerations

- UAS airworthiness
- UAS stores compatibility



### EO Safety Considerations


- When not installed/loaded will have the safety considerations as other EO
- Similar safety issues to other air carried EO when installed/loaded
  - DOS Explosive Safety Advisory Circular (ESAC) 2023/001
  - Arming switches / S&A devices:
    - Require combination of electric with other means depending upon size & complexity
  - Rendering safe post-flight
    - Visual and electronic confirmation
    - Identification and management of damaged, misfired or hung store
  - Electro Explosive Hazards (HERO / RADHAZ, ESD)
    - Inadvertent arming/disarming
    - Dudding of EEDs
    - Logic state disruption / memory effect of S&A devices with repeated flights
  - Weapon danger areas
  - Proximity to lithium batteries (storage concerns & when charging)

### Systems Safety Considerations

- When integrating EO onto a pre-existing UAS platform, there are some inherent risks that are exacerbated and some new risks introduced
- Assessing system assurance through a Risk Based methodology:
  - DASA Advisory Circular 001/2018 Risk Controls for UAS Operations
- Software considerations due to integrated EO:
  - Certification of air dropped munitions software featuring machine learning
  - Siloed software to bypass all safety protocol to provide redundancy feature
- Trials, Test & Evaluation Safety Impacts:
  - Imposed airspace policies impact on realistic training, development and T&E
- Power source and system protections

### Airworthiness Considerations

- DASA Regulations DASR UAS.50 UAS Weaponisation and Carriage of Passenger states
  - "Integration of weapons onto Defence UAS must require approval by the Authority"
- Guidance states that the purpose of Regulation is to provide additional safety assurance as to airworthiness and operational considerations of a weaponised UAS
  - Does not prescribe any limitations on a Commander's decision of when or how to employ those weapons once approved by the Authority
  - May only operate under a Certified or Specific Type A category UAS
  - Guidance states that applications may consider approaches for mitigation of weaponisation risks
  - More generally, risk-based approach informed by Systems Safety and EO Safety
  - AC 001/2018 Risk Controls for UAS Operations



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### Considerations Under DASR UAS.50




Mitigation of Risks outlined in UAS.50 Guidance must address:

- Exposure of MEP or the GP to hazards
  - Adoption of RCC 321-23 and 323-18 Common Risk Criteria Standards for air weapons and UAS operations on test ranges respectively
  - Conduct of RHA → Weapon danger areas and templates for munitions
- Impacts to airworthiness of the platform weapon release and/or separation
  - Tailoring of crewed ASC standards and approaches e.g. MIL-HDBK-1763 and others
- Hazards launch/recovery and/or flight loads of the UAS/weapon combination
  - Tailoring of crewed ASC standards and approaches standardisation of suspension equipment and electrical interconnections

### Considerations Under DASR UAS.50

Mitigation of Risks outlined in UAS.50 Guidance notes must address:

- Accuracy, integrity, availability and continuity of targeting applications upon the deploying of the weapon system including latency of the C2 link
  - Usage of existing assured UAS ISR sensors and standard electrical interfaces
- Sufficient coverage within OIP of the likely risk profiles associated with the application and/or intended mission of the UAS to aid the RP
  - Provision of ASC like OIP tailored for UAS operations
    of munition
- Safety of any laser technology
  - Usage of ISR laser output on existing UAS







### UAS Store Compatibility Considerations

### Crewed Aircraft – Military standards and Handbooks used as references

- Address compatibility and certification of air weapons and missiles, some examples
  - MIL-HDBK-1763, Aircraft/Stores Compatibility: Systems Engineering Data Requirements and Test Procedures
  - MIL-STD-8591, Airborne Stores Suspension Equipment
  - MIL-HDBK-244A, Guide to Aircraft/Stores Compatibility
  - MIL-STD-1760D, Aircraft/Store Electrical Interconnection System

### Dedicated standards and standardisation for UAS-based stores

- To adopt a tailored approach using existing Standards and Handbooks
  - Utilise existing stores compatibility methods MIL-HDBK-1763
  - Informed by DASA Factsheet for ALS
- No standardisation of suspension equipment/electrical interconnection
  - Tailored to scale and size of munition Small LM may adopt or define
  - Requires further consultation





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### Summary

### Conclusion / findings

- Continuing to gravitate to one internationally recognised regulation for UAS munition systems
- Continuation in the approach for SUAS to risk-based assessments to safety and airworthiness to better enable development of unique systems

#### Recommendations

- Adoption of certification planning approach to UAS weaponisation outlining:
  - Systems safety case
  - EO safety & suitability
  - Weapon danger areas and safety templates IAW with RCC standards
  - Stores compatibility IAW tailored MIL-HDBK-1763





### Questions?





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